Joint criminal enterprise as a pathway to convicting individuals for genocide

Journal of International Criminal Justice

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 184-207

  van Sliedregt, Elies ^a  

^a LEIDEN UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

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EID: 33947668944     PISSN: 14781387     EISSN: 14781395     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jicj/mql042     Document Type: Article

References (153)

1. See Werner Rohde & Eight Others United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of War Criminals (UNWCC) (London: HMO 1947-1949), Vol. V, 56
2. Bruno Tesch & Others (Zyklon B case) UNWCC, Vol. I, at 101.
3. Max Wielen & Seventeen others (Stalag Luft III case) UNWCC, Vol. XI, 46.
4. Martin Gottfried Weiss & Thirty-Nine Others (Dachau Concentration Camp case) UNWCC, Vol. XI, 5-17.
5. Otto Sandrock & three others case UNWCC, Vol. IV, 40
6. Erich Heyer & Six Others (The Essen Lynching case) cited in Judgment, Tadić (IT-94-1-A), Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999 (hereinafter Tadić Appeal Judgment), §§ 204-209
7. Kurt Goebell et al. (The Borkum island cases) cited in Tadić Appeal Judgment, §§ 210-213.
8. Opinion and Judgment, Tadić (IT-94-1-T), Trial Chamber II, 7 May 1997 (hereinafter Tadić Judgment), §373.
9. (i) The first category relates to cases where all co-defendants possessing the same intent pursue a common criminal design, for instance the killing of a certain person. (ii) The second category concerns the so-called 'concentration camp' cases, where the requisite actus reus comprises the active participation in the enforcement of a system of repression, as it could be inferred from the position of authority and the specific functions held by each accused. The mens rea element comprises: (i) knowledge of the nature of the system and (ii) the intent to further the common concerted design to ill treat inmates. Intent may also be inferred from the accused position within the camp. (iii) The third category concerns cases where 'one of the perpetrators commits an act which, while outside the common design, was nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of the effecting of that common purpose'. Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 4, §204.
10. Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 4, §228.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., §192.
13. Indictment ('Bosnia Herzegovina'), Milošević (IT-01-51-1), § 5-31
14. First Amended Indictment ('Croatia') Milošević (IT-02-54-T, § 5-33
15. Second Amended Indictment Slobodan Milošević, Milan Milutinović, Nikola Sainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Vlajiko Stojiljković (IT-99-37-PT), §16-29:
16. Judgment, Krajišnik (IT-00-39-T), Trial Chamber I, 27 September 2006 (hereinafter Krajišnik Judgment).
17. See J. S. Martinez and A.M. Danner 'Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law' 93 California Law Review (2005) 75, at 102-120.
18. Superior responsibility requires proof beyond reasonable doubt that superiors have effective control over their subordinates (functional element), that they had information within their possession that would have put them on notice of the crimes (allegedly) committed by subordinates (cognitive element) and that they failed to prevent or punish the crimes (operational element). This relates especially to the hierarchical structure or chain of command between senior (political) figures and the actual perpetrators (local war lords and paramilitary units) and the knowledge of, and effective control over, every single crime are elements, which in practice are difficult to prove.
19. Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Per-Johan Lindholm, Judgment, Simić (IT-95-9-T), Trial Chamber II, 17 October 2003, § 2-5.
20. Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 4, §203.
21. Ibid., §228.
22. Judgment, Krnojelac (IT-97-25-T), Trial Chamber I, 15 March 2002, §78 (hereinafter Krnojelac Judgment).
23. Judgment, Krnojelac (IT-98-30/1-T), Trial Chamber I, 2 November 2001, §278 (hereinafter Kvočka Judgment).
24. V. Haan, 'The Development of the Concept of Joint Criminal Enterprise at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia', 5 International Criminal Law Review (2005) 167-2001, at 190.
25. Martinez and Danner, supra note 12, at 137.
26. M.J. Osiel, 'The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity', 105 Columbia Law Review (2005) 1751-1862, at 1772.
27. Judgment, Krnojelac (IT-97-25-A), Appeals Chamber, 17 September 2003, §116 (hereinafter Krnojelac Appeal Judgment).
28. Judgment, Kvočka (IT-98-30/1-A), Appeals Chamber, 28 February 2005, §97 (hereinafter Kvočka Appeal Judgment).
29. See for an elaborate account and commentary: K. Gustafson, 'The Requirement of an "Express Agreement" for Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability' in this Symposium.
30. Judgment, Brd anin (IT-99-36-T), Trial Chamber I, 1 September 2004, § 347 (hereinafter Brd anin Judgment).
31. Order on Amicus Curiae observations proprio motu on the desirability of submissions on the alternative basis of individual criminal responsibility alleged in the case and on the issue of trials in absentia, Milošević (IT-02-54-T), 1 July 2005.
32. In this it relied on the text of Art. 2(3)(c) of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, See Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 4, §221.
33. Ibid., §192
34. Ibid., §220.
35. Ibid., §192.
36. Separate Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Challenge by Ojdanić to Jurisdiction Joint Criminal Enterprise, Milutonović et al. (IT-99-37-AR72), 21 May 2003, §31.
37. This Trial Chamber was presided over by Judge David Hunt.
38. Krnojelac Judgment, supra note 17, §77.
39. Ibid.
40. Judgment, Krstić (IT-98-33-T), Trial Chamber I, 2 August 2001, §§ 643-645 (hereinafter Krstić Judgment)
41. Kvočka Judgment, supra note 18, §284.
42. Judgment, Krstić (IT-98-33-A), Appeals Chamber, 19 April 2004, §§ 135-144 (hereinafter Krstić Appeal Judgment).
43. Judgment, Stakić (IT-97-24), Trial Chamber II, 31 July 2003, §530 (hereinafter Stakić Judgment).
44. Rule 98bis Decision, Brdanin (IT-99-36-T), Trial Chamber, 28 November 2003, §29 (hereinafter Brdanin 98bis Decision).
45. Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, Brdanin (IT-99-36-A), Appeals Chamber, 19 March 2004, §7 (hereinafter Brdanin Interlocutory Appeal Decision).
46. Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, Milošević (IT-54-02-T), Trial Chamber, 16 June 2004, §291 (hereinafter Milošević Decision on Acquittal).
47. G. Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals (Oxford: OUP 2005), at 265.
48. C. Kress, 'The Darfur Report and Genocidal Intent', 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2005) 562-578, at 566.
49. Krstić Appeal Judgment, supra note 36, §134.
50. Prosecution's Appeal Brief, Jelišić (IT-95-10-A), at §4 and 22
51. See Judgment on Defence Motions to Acquit, Sikirica (IT-95-8-T), Trial Chamber III, 3 September 2001, §27.
52. A.K.A. Greenawalt, 'Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-based Interpretation', 99 Columbia Law Review (1999) 2259-2295, at 2288
53. H. Vest, Genozid durch organisatorische Machtapparate (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002) 104
54. (referred to by Kress, supra note 42).
55. E. David, Principes de droit des conflits armés (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1999), at 615
56. Kress, supra note 42, 562-578
57. A. Gil Gil, Derecho Penal Internacional: Especial consideracíon del delitto de genocide (Madrid, Editorial Tecnos, 1999), 259
58. 259 et seq. (referred to by Kress).
59. Greenawalt, supra note 45, at 2259.
60. Kress, supra note 42, 562-578.
61. Ibid., at 578.
62. Ibid., at 577.
63. Ibid., at 571-572.
64. N.H.B. Jørgensen, 'The Definition of Genocide: Joining the Dots in the Light of Recent Practice', 1 International Criminal Law Review (2002) 285-313, at 298.
65. Consider, for instance, §571 of the Krstić Trial Chamber, where the Trial Chamber required the perpetrator would act '[w]ith the goal of destroying all or part of a group' and §§ 622 and 634 where it was sufficient that the accused was aware of the overall genocidal activity. Krstić Judgment, supra note 35.
66. See Kress, supra note 42, at 566
67. and E. Van Sliedregt, Commentary to Krstić Judgment, in A. Klip and G. Sluiter, Annotated Leading Cases VII (Antwerpen, Oxford, New York: Intersentia, 2005) 767-772.
68. See Krstić Judgment, supra note 35, §571,
69. and Krstić Appeal Judgment, supra note 36, §134.
70. In its essence, special intent is a purpose-oriented intent, distinguishable from general intent by requiring the actor to desire a particular purpose See O. Triffterer, 'Genocide, Its Particular Intent to Destroy in Whole or in Part the Group as Such', 14 Leiden Journal of International Law (2001) 399-408, at 403-404.
71. Krstić Appeal Judgment, supra note 36, §140.
72. Judgment, Blagojević & Jokić (IT-02-60-T), Trial Chamber I, 17 January 2005, §782.
73. J.C. Smith, Smith & Hogan. Criminal Law (8th edn., London/Edinburgh/ Dublin: Butterworths, 1996), at 130
74. Att.-Gen. Reference (No. 1 of 1975), [1975] 2 All ER 684, at 686.
75. For a description see Mettraux, supra note 41, 263-265
76. and L.J. van den Herik and E. van Sliedregt, 'Ten Years later, the Rwanda Tribunal still faces Legal Complexities: Some Comments on the Vagueness of the Indictment, Complicity in Genocide, and the Nexus Requirement for War Crimes, 17 Leiden Journal of International Law (2004) 537-557, at 544-551.
77. In a recent national trial where a Dutch national was accused of supplying chemicals to Saddam Hussein and prosecuted for aiding and abetting genocide, the judges applied these findings as 'sufficiently developed' and 'settled in law' [author's translation]. District Court, The Hague, 23 December 2005, LJN:AU8685 (not yet reported). (http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/zoeken/dtluitspraak.asp; visited 13 February 2006).
78. For a commentary on the case, see H.G. van der Wilt, 'Genocide, Complicity in Genocide and International v. Domestic Jurisdiction', 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2006) 239-257.
79. Krstić Appeal Judgment, supra note 36, footnote 247.
80. Milošević Decision on Acquittal, supra note 40, §248.
81. Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 4, §229.
82. Mettraux, supra note 41, at 259.
83. Stakić Judgment, supra note 37, §530.
84. Brdanin Judgment, supra note 25, §29.
85. See Triffterer, supra note 55, 403-404. In Dutch law a participant could be held responsible for a principal's special intent by way of dolus eventualis.
86. See M.M. van Torenburg, Medeplegen (Coperpetration) (Tilburg: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1998), at 113
87. Noyon-Langemeijer-Remmelink, Wetboek van Strafrecht (Code of Criminal Law - A Commentary) suppl. 121, Art. 47, Dutch Penal Code, §25.
88. See also references in Krstić Appeal Judgment, supra note 36, §141.
89. S.H. Kadish, 'Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine', 73 California Law Review (1985), 323 et seq., 337.
90. See for a discussion on the relationship between causation and complicity: K.J.M. Smith, A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity (Oxford: OUP, 1991), at 69
91. Kadish, supra note 67, at 333
92. H.L.A. Hart and A.M. Honoré, Causation in the Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959).
93. Smith & Hogan, supra note 58, at 147.
94. It was held in Rook that the same principles apply to a party who is absent as to one who is present, [1993] 2 All ER 955, at 130.
95. After all, the absent party may well be the 'mastermind' and the most culpable party. Smith & Hogan, supra note 58, at 147.
96. Smith, supra note 68, at 80, footnote 101.
97. Ibid., at 209-234.
98. Smith and Hogan, supra note 58, at 147.
99. See Kadish, supra note 67, at 344-345, n. 36.
100. Smith and Hogan, supra note 58, at 127-129.
101. Smith, supra note 68, at 209
102. and Smith and Hogan, supra note 58, at 148,
103. referring to the decision of the Privy Council in Chan Wing-Sing v. R. (1985) 80 Cr App Rep 117:'(The principle) turns on contemplation. . .. It meets the case of a crime foreseen as a possible incident of the common unlawful enterprise. The criminal culpability lies in participating in the venture with that foresight'.
104. A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP, 2003), at 434.
105. In DPP for Northern Ireland v. Maxwell ([1978] 3 All ER 1140), a reckless knowledge test was introduced for complicity. As to the mental element of the accomplice, it suffices that he '[k]nows that one or more of a group of offences is virtually certain to be committed, which means that in relation to the one(s) actually committed there was knowledge only of a risk that it would be actually committed - and that amounts to recklessness'.
106. Ashworth, supra note 77, at 442.
107. Judgment, Furundžjia (IT-95-17/1-T), Trial Chamber II, 10 December 1998, §246.
108. See §2 above.
109. As one commentator said, '[a]s distinct from common crimes, international crimes are almost always committed not by one person, but by several or many persons - a group, a band, a clique'. See A.N. Trainin, Hitlerite Responsibility under International Law (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1944), at 79.
110. See also D. Cohen 'Beyond Nuremberg: Individual Responsibility for War Crimes' in C. Hesse and R. Post (eds) Human Rights in Political Transitions: Gettysburg to Bosnia (New York: Zone Books, 1999), at 53-92.
111. Mittäterschaft, Art. 25(2) German Penal Code, Coaction, Art. 66 Belgian Penal Code, Medeplegen, Art. 47(1) Dutch Penal Code.
112. F. Desportes and F. Le Gunehec, Le Nouveau Droit Pénal (7th edn., Paris: Economic, 2000), §566, at 494.
113. J.S. Bell et al., Principles of French Law (Oxford: OUP, 1998), at 238.
114. Dutch Supreme Court, 20 January 1998, NJ (Dutch Law Reports) 1998, 426.
115. French law penalizes 'participation in a group formed or an understanding reached for the perpetration of one of the felonies specified in Arts 211-1, 212-1, and 212-2 (genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, EvS), when evidenced by one or more overt acts', Art. 212-3, §1 Code Pénal [Translation: The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes, Vol. 31: France (1999)].
116. See also Desportes and Le Gunehec, supra note 82, at 461.
117. Moreover, the French concept of 'association de malfaiteurs' - a concept that inspired the drafters of the Nuremberg Statute to penalize membership of a criminal organization - has been equally devised to deal with mob violence by overcoming causality problems, Arts. 450-1 to 450-4 of the Code Pénal. Dutch law provides for an analogous concept in Art 140 of the Dutch Penal Code. [Translation: The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes, Vol. 30: The Netherlands (1997)].
118. Krnojelac Appeal Judgment, supra note 22, §75
119. Kvočka Appeal Judgment, supra note 23, §§ 87-92.
120. See also Gustafson, supra note 24, at 9-10.
121. Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 4, §229
122. Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 4, §204.
123. Krajišnik Judgment, supra note 11, at §834.
124. Haan, supra note 19, at 194-195.
125. For instance, by requiring the accused to make a substantial contribution to the JCE. Kvočka Appeal Judgment, supra note 23, § 278.
126. Haan, supra note 19, at 195.
127. See for another view, Gustafson, supra note 24.
128. Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction - Joint Criminal Enterprise, Milutinovic et al. (IT-99-37-AR72), Appeals Chamber, 21 May 2003, §20.
129. Kvočka Appeal Judgment, supra note 23, §91.
130. Kvočka Judgment, supra note 18, §73.
131. Corrected in Kvočka Appeal Judgment, supra note 23, §73.
132. Article 121-6 Code Pénal. H. Angevin and A. Chavanne (eds), Juris-Classeur pénal (Paris: Juris-Classeur, 1998) Complicité, Art. 121-6 et 121-7, Introduction, A et B, 1 à 16.
133. §25(2) StGB. H.H. Jescheck and T. Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts. Allgemeiner Teil (5th edn., Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1996), 645-646.
134. Article 47(1) sub 1 Dutch Penal Code. Noyon-Langemeijer-Remmelink, supra note 65, Art. 47, §1a., at 324a-326a.
135. Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 4, §188.
136. 4] 3 W.L.R. 677.
137. J.R. Spencer,'On Contemplating the Range of Contemplation', 44 Cambridge Law Journal (1985), at 10.
138. Milošević Decision on Acquital, supra note 40, §291.
139. Brdanin Interlocutory Appeal Decision, supra note 39, §7.
140. An aider and abettor does not share the intent of the principal. He or she must (i) be aware of the essential elements of the crime committed by the principal offender, including the principal's mens rea and (ii) further know that his or her own acts assisted in the commission of the specific crime in question. See Krnojelac Judgment, supra note 16, § 88-90
141. and R. Dixon et al., Archbold International Ciminal Courts: Practice, Procedure and Evidence (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003), §10-15.
142. Stakić Judgment, supra note 37, §530.
143. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, Brdanin Interlocutory Appeal Decision, supra note 39, §2, 4-5.
144. Kress, supra note 42, at 577.
145. This author does not agree with the Trial Chamber's findings in the Krajišnik case (Supra note 11) where JCE was applied to a large-scale enterprise with a changing purpose and differing membership. Such interpretation makes the central element of JCE liability, a 'common plan', elusive.
146. Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 4, §191.
147. See, for the concept of 'perpetration by means (of an agent)', E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge/The Hague: T.M. C. Asser Press, 2003), at 68-71.
148. See van Sliedregt, supra note 112, at 69-70.
149. The German 'Tatherrschaft' theory equally provides for indirect perpetration without an innocent agent. C. Roxin, Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft (Berlin-New York: De Gruyter, 2000), 242-52, 653-654.
150. So does the Dutch doctrine of 'functional perpetration'. Dutch Supreme Court, 23 February 1954, NJ 1954, 378.
151. According to Black's Law Dictionary, to 'commit' means 'to perpetrate, as a crime'. The same source defines 'perpetration' as 'the act of one committing a crime either with his own hands, or by some means or instrument or through some innocent agent'. Black's Law Dictionary (6th edn., St. Paul, MN 1990), 273 and 1141.
152. Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction - Joint Criminal Enterprise, Milutonovic et al. (IT-99-37-AR72), Appeals Chamber, 21 May 2003, §21.
153. The efforts of the Trial Chamber in Stakić to develop co-perpetration along the lines of German criminal law concepts such as 'mittelbare Täterschaft' should be understood against that background. Such efforts should be faulted. The Trial Chamber relied exclusively on German law and failed to examine customary international law and/or general principles of law while developing a concept that bears no resemblance to JCE as introduced by the Tadić Appeals Chamber. Stakić Judgment, supra note 37, §§ 741-743.