The concept of a joint criminal enterprise and domestic modes of liability for parties to a crime

Journal of International Criminal Justice

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 208-226

  Hamdorf, Kai ^a  

^a District Court of Itzehoe ^*  (Germany)

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EID: 33947587425     PISSN: 14781387     EISSN: 14781395     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jicj/mql084     Document Type: Article

References (117)

1. ICTY Judgment, Tadić (IT-94-1), Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, §§ 185-237.
2. E.g. in the 'bathtub' case where a young mother asked her sister to kill her newborn child, the sister - who followed the mother's will - was classified as a mere aider to the infanticide committed by the mother, although the mother herself had not laid a hand upon the child (Decisions of the Reichsgericht in Criminal Law - Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen [RGSt] 74, 84).
3. For an in-depth analysis in English see C.-E. Herlitz, Parties to a Crime (Uppsala: Iustus förlag, 1992), 259-410.
4. For case law reference, see P. Cramer and G. Heine, in A. Schönke, H. Schröder et al., Strafgesetzbuch - Kommentar (27th edn., Munich: C.H. Beck, 2006), at 509, margin 87/88.
5. Ibid., at 527 margin 6a;
6. H.-H. Jescheck and T. Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts - Allgemeiner Teil (5th edn., Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996), at 651-654
7. K. Kühl, Strafrecht - Allgemeiner Teil (4th edn., Munich: Vahlen, 2002), at 766-767 margin 26-29
8. C. Roxin, Strafrecht - Allgemeiner Teil, Band II - Besondere Erscheinungsformen der Straftat (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2003), at 38-105.
9. BGHSt 40, 218
10. BGHSt 42, 68 (regarding a regimental commander at the border)
11. BGHSt 45, 296 (for members of the 'Politbüro des Zentralkomitees der SED')
12. BGHSt 40, 316 (regarding the falsification of the result of an election)
13. Cramer and Heine, supra note 4, at 530 margin 25-25a;
14. Roxin, ibid., at margin 128.
15. Jescheck and Weigend, supra note 5, at 678
16. Kühl, supra note 5, at 806
17. Roxin, ibid., at 79
18. H. Tröndle, T. Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch (53rd edn., Munich: C.H. Beck, 2006), at 214 margin 6.
19. Tröndle and Fischer, ibid., at 215 margin 6.
20. BGHSt 32, 178
21. Tröndle and Fischer, ibid., at 216 margin 6.
22. Jescheck and Weigend, supra note 5, at 678
23. Kühl, supra note 5, at 817
24. Roxin, supra note 5, at 81.
25. Cramer and Heine, supra note 4, at 518 margin 115.
26. Under German law, an act can be unlawful even if the offender was insane.
27. See the case law of the former Reichsgericht RGSt 58, at 113
28. RGSt 67, at 193
29. RGSt 71, at 178
30. and also of the BGH in BGHSt 2, at 130
31. BGH, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2001), at 2410.
32. See the case law references in Cramer and Heine, supra note 4, at 554 margin 12
33. Tröndle and Fischer, supra note 7, at 228 margin 7.
34. BGHSt 42, at 138.
35. For details, see Cramer and Heine, supra note 4, at 277 margin 64-87b;
36. Tröndle and Fischer, supra note 7, at 113 margin 5-11g.
37. The different concepts and doctrines are too detailed to be presented here. For a summary see Cramer and Heine, ibid.
38. Tröndle and Fischer, ibid.
39. BGHSt 36, at 1
40. BGH, Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (1999), at 508 and (1984), at 19.
41. BGHSt 36, at 231
42. Cramer and Heine, supra note 4, at 542 margin 94
43. Jescheck and Weigend, supra note 5, at 677
44. Kühl, supra note 5, at 817
45. Roxin, supra note 5, at 80
46. Tröndle and Fischer, supra note 7, at 217 margin 8a.
47. See for example RGSt 44, 321 - a judgment of 2 February 1911 - where the common plan was to inflict bodily harm and suddenly one perpetrator killed the victim.
48. RGSt 67, 367, judgment of 23 November 1933.
49. BGH, Goldtammers Archiv (1968) 121.
50. BGH, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, (1973) 377.
51. BGH, Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (2002) at 597-598.
52. Jescheck and Weigend, supra note 5, at 677
53. Kühl, supra note 5, at 817
54. Roxin, supra note 5, at 80-81.
55. BGH, Monatsschrift für Deutsches Recht (1966) 197.
56. BGH, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1973) 377.
57. Example taken from Cramer and Heine, supra note 4, at 535 margin 53.
58. Cramer and Heine, ibid., at 535 margin 54.
59. Decision of the Bundesgerichtshof in Criminal Law - Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen (BGHSt) 11, at 268.
60. This judgment was supported by most scholars, see Jescheck and Weigend, supra note 5, at 676
61. Kühl, supra note 5, at 819.
62. It was, however, criticized by Roxin, supra note 5, at 80.
63. M.J. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law (8th edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 199
64. Smith & Hogan, Criminal Law (11th edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 165.
65. Allen, ibid., at 199
66. Smith & Hogan, ibid., at 164, submitting that '[i]t has always been sufficient to prove that the defendant was either the principal or a secondary party ... [b]ut the charge should, wherever possible, specify the actual mode of participation alleged'.
67. Allen, ibid., at 198
68. Smith & Hogan, ibid., at 166.
69. Allen, ibid., at 198
70. Smith & Hogan, ibid., at 167.
71. Smith & Hogan, ibid., at 168. The same applies under German law for the so-called 'eigenhändige Delikte'.
72. Smith & Hogan, ibid., at 168.
73. Ibid., at 167.
74. Allen, supra note 32, at 201
75. Smith & Hogan, ibid., at 172.
76. Bryce (2004) EWCA Crim 1231
77. and (2004) Crim LR 936.
78. Smith & Hogan, supra note 32, at 173 with reference to Gianetto (1996) Crim LR 722, giving the example: 'I am going to kill your wife'; Husband:'Oh goody'.
79. Smith & Hogan, ibid., at 174.
80. For example, in Millward (1994) Crim LR 527: D instructed his employee, P, to drive on a road a vehicle which D knew, but P did not know, was in a dangerous condition. The condition of the vehicle resulted in a collision causing death. P was acquitted of the charge of causing death by reckless driving, but D was convicted of procuring the actus reus of reckless driving.
81. Allen, supra note 32, at 203
82. Smith & Hogan, supra note 32, at 176.
83. Allen, supra note 32, at 207
84. Smith & Hogan, supra note 32, at 179.
85. Johnson r. Youden (1950) 1 All ER 300.
86. W. Wilson, Criminal Law: Doctrine and Theory (2nd edn., London: Longman, 2003), at 595: 'If A is primed to drive the getaway car for an undisclosed crime, and can do no more than guess at what that crime may be, they [he] will not be an accessory.'
87. 9) 4 All ER 545.
88. 8) 3 All ER 1140.
89. Allen, supra note 32, at 214
90. Smith & Hogan, supra note 32, at 189.
91. W. Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, vol. 2 (2nd edn., 1960), at 21
92. Allen, supra note 32, at 215
93. Smith & Hogan, supra note 32, at 188.
94. Preston Crown Court, December 1985,
95. unreported, cited after Smith & Hogan, supra note 32, at 188.
96. It is not entirely clear in English law, whether this form of liability is to be distinguished from aiding, abetting and procuring as a separate mode of liability or whether it is just one form of aiding, abetting and procuring, for this discussion, see J.C. Smith, 'Criminal Liability of Accessories: Law and Law Reform', 113 Law Quarterly Review, (1997) 453-467, at 462.
97. 5) 1 AC 168.
98. Chan Wing-Siu v. The Queen [1985] AC 168, at 175.
99. Allen, supra note 32, at 215
100. M.T. Molan, Cases & Materials on Criminal Law (3rd edn., London: Cavendish, 2005) at 340
101. Smith & Hogan, supra note 32, at 193.
102. Crown Court in Northern Ireland (1989) NI 268.
103. See also Wilson, supra note 47, at 595: 'It would be wrong, for example, if A gave P explosives to blow open a safe, to convict A of murder if P used them to blow up an inhabited office block'.
104. House of Lords (1997) 4 All ER 545.
105. Court of Appeal (1998) 2 All ER 744.
106. This view is criticized by C.M.V Clarkson and H.M. Keating, Criminal Law: Text and Materials (5th edn., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) at 545: 'While, of course, a gun is intrinsically more dangerous than a wooden post, nevertheless, if the defendant has foreseen the principal offender murdering the victim, it is difficult to see why the method of killing, or the instrument used, should make such a fundamental difference.'
107. See also Clarkson and Keating, ibid., at 545, referring to Art. 6 ECHR.
108. Supra note 59.
109. See update to Smith & Hogan, supra note 32, Chapter 8, available online at http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780406977304/resources/updates/ ch08.pdf (visited 21 August 2006).
110. Smith & Hogan, ibid., at 92.
111. Ibid., at 94.
112. Ibid., at 103.
113. Ibid., at 109.
114. Ibid., at 109.
115. A.M. Danner and J.S. Martinez, 'Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law', 93 California Law Review (2005) 75-169.
116. E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), at 4-5.
117. The wording of the statutes, namely Art. 25(3) of the Rome Statute, is not an argument for nor against the distinction between different modes of liability. While this article clearly distinguishes certain forms of participation, all participant are treated equally, i.e. like a perpetrator. Of course, this does not prevent the judges from basing the length of the sentence on the mode of liability.