Mens rea - Mistake of law & mistake of fact in German criminal law: A survey for international criminal tribunals

International Criminal Law Review

Volumn 5, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 203-246

  Elewabadar, Mohamed ^a  

^a MINISTRY OF JUSTICE   (Egypt)

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EID: 84856944319     PISSN: 1567536X     EISSN: 15718123     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/1571812054127790     Document Type: Review

References (201)

1. While the terminology utilised varies, these two elements have been described as "universal and persistent in mature systems of law". See Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., (Case No. IT-96-21-T), Judgment, 16 November 1998, para. 424 (also known as Čelebići)
2. quoting Morissette v. United States (1952) 342 U. S. 246.
3. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annexed to Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544
4. U. N. T. S. 279; Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 19 January 1946, T. I. A. S. No. 1589.
5. See Antonio Cassese, International Criminal law, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) 159-60. Professor Schabas noted that "article 30 of the Rome Statute is not only confusing and ambiguous, it is also superfluous, and that judges of the International Criminal Court, like their colleagues at the ICTY, would easily have understood the mental element of crimes without them having to be told."
6. William A. Schabas, 'Mens rea and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia', 37 New England Law Review (2003) 1015, 1024.
7. See the thorough and systematic analysis of civil and common law jurisdictions with regard to the mens rea required for recklessness or dolus eventualis as adopted by Blaškić's Defence in Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, (Case No. IT-95-14-A), Appellant's Appeal Brief, 14 January 2002, Section VIII, pp. 128-132 (on file with the author);
8. In Jelisić, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) argued that the concept of dolus specialis, which is a civil law term used to describe the mens rea of a crime, set too high a standard, and could not be equated with the common law concepts of "specific intent" or "special intent", as a consequence, the OTP undertaken a comparative analysis with respect mens rea standards in both civil and common law systems, Prosecutor v. Jelisić, (Case No. IT-95-10-A), Prosecution's Appeal Brief (Redacted Version), Section IV entitled "Mens rea Standards in Comparative Law".
9. See Catherine Elliott, 'The French Law of Intent and Its Influence on the Development of International Criminal Law', 11 Criminal Law Forum (2000) 35, 36-38.
10. The Model Penal Code (MPC) limits the number of men rea terms to four: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. For a thorough analysis of the MPC see Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, 'Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 Stanford Law Review (1997) 681, 719-24.
11. But for a critique view of the Model Penal Code's mens rea see Kenneth W. Simons, 'Should the Model Penal Code's Mens rea Provisions be Amended' 1Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law (2003) 179.
12. For the erroneous interpretation of mens rea standard for 'ordering' adopted by Blaškić Trial Chamber see Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, (Case No. IT-95-14-T), Judgment, 3 March 2000, paras. 562, 592, 653, 738, and 741.
13. See Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. (Case No. IT-96-21-T), Prosecutor's Response to the Pre-Trial Briefs of the Accused, 14 April 1997, Section 5 'Mens rea', (on file with the author).
14. citing M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law, (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992) 290-91. In support of this argument, the Prosecution relies on the Commentary to article 85 of Additional Protocol I which defines 'wilfully' in the following terms: "the accused must have acted consciously and with intent, i.e., with his mind on the act and its consequences, and willing them ('criminal intent' or 'malice aforethought'); this encompasses concepts of 'wrongful intent' or 'recklessness', viz., the attitude of an agent who, without being certain of a particular result, accepts the possibility of it happening; on the other hand, ordinary negligence or lack of foresight is not covered, i.e., when a man acts without having his mind on the act or its consequences."
15. See Claude Pilloud, Jean De Preux, Yves Sandos et al., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987) Art. 85 of the Additional Protocol 1.
16. In this regard, the Defence cites the English case of R v. Sheppard [1981] AC 394 HL, and quotes the statement made by Lord Diplock therein, that "[t]he primary meaning of 'wilfully' is 'deliberate'"
17. R v. Sheppard [1981] AC 394 HL, p. 418.
18. Rv. Crabbe (1985) 58 ALR 417. Cf. the previous view that the possibility of death or grievous bodily harm might be sufficient, Pemble v. the Queen
19. (1971) 124 CLR 107.
20. Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd ed., (London: Stevens & Sons, 1983) 123-24.
21. Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, supra note 24, (footnotes omitted).
22. Cassese, International Criminal law, supra note 6, p. 164.
23. In determining the meaning of the terms utilised in the ICTY Statute the Trial Chamber followed Fletcher analysis: "the method of analysing ordinary usage invites us to consider what these terms mean as they are used, not what they mean when wrenched out of context and defined for the purposes of legal analysis." See George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978) 451.
24. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, (Case No. ICTR-96-4-T), Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 498 (English Translation). However, the same Trial Chamber in para. 520 contradict itself by adopting a different standard of the mens rea of genocide: "[w]ith regard to the crime of genocide, the offender is culpable only when he has committed one of the offences charged under Article 2(2) of the Statute with the clear intent to destroy... a particular group. The offender is culpable because he knew or should have known that the act committed would destroy, in whole or in part, a group. "
25. The Akayesu Trial Chamber cited the following publications: F. Desportes and F. Le Gunehec, Le Nouveau Droit Pénal, Tome 1, Droit pénal général, 3rd ed. (1996), 364;
26. M. L. Rassat, Droit pénal général, 2nd edition (1999), 353, who specifically distinguishes between "dol spécial" and "l'exigence d'un but particulier" (the requirement of a particular goal);
27. C. Elliot, 'The French Law of Intent and Its Influence on the Development of International Criminal Law', 11 Criminal Law Reform (2000) 35, 41. Elliot assigns to dol special the meaning of intent towards the result of the act and defines additional aims as dol aggravé.
28. Prosecutor v. Jelisić, (Case No. IT-95-10-A), Prosecution's Appeal Brief (Public Redacted Version), para. 4. 22;
29. See also Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-I) Judgement on Defence Motions to Acquit, 3 September 2001, para. 142.
30. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, (Case No. IT-95-10-A), Judgement, 5 July 2001, para. 51.
31. Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al., Judgement on Defence Motions to Acquit, supra note 33, para. 60.
32. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Judgement, supra note 34, paras. 43, 51.
33. Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, (Case No. ICTY-IT-98-33), Judgment, Aug. 2, 2001, para. 571.
34. The term "surplus of intent" was first used by the Yugoslav Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, (Case No. IT-97-24-T), Judgment, 31 July 2003, para. 520.
35. Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, (Case No. IT-95-14-A), Appellant's Brief on Appeal, 14 January 2002, p. 130. Reference has been made by the Appellant with regard to para. 278 of the Judgment rendered by Blaškić Trial Chamber.
36. The Appeals Chamber referred to the definition of recklessness as provided for in the Model Penal Code: "a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from [the actor's] conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation. " However, it is to be noted that the requirement that the defendant "consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk" under the MPC is ambiguous. The MPC recognizes a reckless actor as a person who must be aware of "substantial and unjustifiable" risk; are these conjunctive or disjunctive requirements? What type or degree of consciousness is required? Of what, precisely, must the actor be aware? For a critique opinion on "recklessness as defined in the MPC see Kenneth Simons, 'Should the Model Penal Code's Mens rea Provision be Amended', supra note 10, p. 179.
37. Prosecutorv. Tihomir Blaškić, Appeals Judgment, supra note 1, para. 38.
38. See Section III (C) (1) of the present study. For a Common law perspective see Alan C. Michaels, 'Acceptance: The Missing Mental State', 71 Southern California Law Review (1998) 953. (Pubitemid 128429205)
39. "Voluntative" is not a term in English usage and translation seems to be difficult, but the German concepts (wissen and wollen) seems at least to close to "awareness" and "desire". See Roger S. Clark, 'The Mental Element in International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Elements of Offences', 12 Criminal Law Forum (2002) 291, 302.
40. See in general Volker Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil (German Criminal Law: The General Part), (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, vol. 1, 2001) 3-25.
41. These three-stage structures of the criminal offence in German Criminal Law were firstly proposed by Franz von Liszt in his classical Lehrbuch of 1881. Liszt suggested a three-sectional concept of a crime: first there had to be an act, second that this act must be unlawful, and finally that the unlawful act must be characterized as culpable. The same idea was developed by Ernst Beling, (Die Lehre vom Verbrechen, 1906; Die Lehre vom Tatbestand, 1930). According to Liszt and Beling, the criterion for differentiating between unlawfulness and mens rea was the purely formal separation of the objective and the subjective elements of the criminal act. See also Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, 'The Doctrine of Mens rea in German Criminal Law: Its Historical Background and Present Statute', 8 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa (1975) 112, 114-15.
42. Werner F. Ebke and Matthew W. Finkin, Introduction to German Law, (The Hague, London and Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1996) 387. For further analysis with regard to the three stage structure of criminal offence
43. see Naucke, 'An Insider's Perspective on the Significance of German Criminal Theory's General System for Analyzing Criminal Acts', Brigham Young University Law Review (1984) 305.
44. Volker Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 50, p. 9.
45. The main focus of this study is to discuss the mens rea concept in German criminal law and not the objective elements or the actus reus (Der objektive Tatbestand) of the crime, however, the objective elements of a crime can be defined as a components of the following elements: (1) act; (2) circumstances; (3) consequences. For more details on the objective element of crime in the German criminal law see Volker Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil, Teil II, (German Criminal Law The General Part, vol. II), Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2003, pp. 27-101;
46. Ebke and Finkin, Introduction to German Law, supra note 53, pp. 387-8;
47. Theodor Lenckner, in: Schönke and Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar, (München: Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 2001) 165.
48. Paul K. Ryu, 'Discussion of Structure and Theory', 24 The American Journal of Comparative Law (1976) 602, 607.
49. Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil, vol. 2, supra note 57, at 137.
50. Johannes Wessels & Werner Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil (Heidelberg: Müller Verlag, 2002) 125.
51. Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil, vol. 2, supra note 57, at 13;
52. Jescheck & Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts. Allgemeiner Teil, (1996) at 423;
53. Theodor Lenckner, in Adolf Schönke & Horst Schröder (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch: Kommentar (München: Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1997) 192.
54. Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 125.
55. See Jescheck & Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts. Allgemeiner Teil, (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1996), § 38 I, at 407;
56. for critical remarks see Lenckner, in: Schönke/Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch. Kommentar, supra note 57, p. 195;
57. Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil, vol. 2, supra note 57, at 13.
58. BGH St 2, 194 200 (GS) quoted and translated by Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil, vol. 2, supra note 57, at 15.
59. Paul Ryu, 'Discussion of Structure and Theory', supra note 59, at 608.
60. BGHSt 2, 194(201)
61. (Bundesgerichtshof=Federal Supreme Court; official collection of judgments, vol. 2, p. 194 at p. 201).
62. Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 46-8.
63. Jerome Hall, 'The New German Penal Code: Comment on Structure and Theory', 24 The American Journal of Comparative Law (1976) 615, 618.
64. Most notably, in 1924, Edmund Mezger suggested that the objective and material content of unlawfulness (Rechtswidrigkeit) couldn't be defined independently of the mental state of the offender. For more on the theory of the subjective element of unlawfulness see Jescheck, 'The Doctrine of Mens rea in German Criminal Law: Its Historical Background and Present Statute', supra note 52, p. 116.
65. See Claus Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, (Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung: Muenchen 1997) 257.
66. Formerly, however, Vorsatz has been considered to be a legal element of culpability (Schuld) only and has been discussed exclusively at this third stage. For different theories see Wessels and Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 44.
67. See § 15 dStGB. Most notably Vorsatz can also be interpreted in conjunction with §§ 16, 17 dStGB; see Cramer & Sternberg-Lieben, in Schönke & Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch: Kommentar, (Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung: Muenchen, 2001) 244, 247.
68. RGSt 51, 305, 311; 58, 247 (Official Collection of the Judgments of the Reichsgericht 'Court of the Reich').
69. Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 71.
70. Welzel, Das Deutsche Strafrecht, (Berlin: de Gruyter 1969) 64;
71. Karl Lackner, Strafgesetzbuch (München: Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1991) 87;
72. Claus Roxin, 1 Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, (Muenchen: Beck'sche, 1997) 364;
73. Peter Cramer, 'Vorsätzliches und Fahrlässiges Handlen', in Adolf Schönke & Horst Schröder (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar (München: Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung 1997) 248.
74. Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil, vol. 2, supra note 57, at 109.
75. The first two forms of Vorsatz are roughly equivalent to the Model Penal Code concepts of purpose and knowledge. See Michaels, 'Acceptance: The Missing Mental State', supra note 48, at 1025.
76. For further details on the mens rea concept under the Model Penal Code see Wayne R. La Fave and Austin W. Scott, 1 Substantive Criminal Law, (U. S. A.: West Law Publishing, 1986) 296-340.
77. Steffen Wirth, 'Germany's New International Crimes Code: Bringing a Case to Court', 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003) 151, 155.
78. Otto Triffterer, 'Genocide, Its Particular Intent to Destroy in Whole or in Part the Group as Such', 14 Leiden Journal of International Law 399, 404(2001). German lawyers distinguish between Vorsatz (intention) and Absicht (purpose or aim) and use the latter term to refer to the intent requirement in larceny, fraud and various forms of inchoate offences.
79. See Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, supra note 29, p. 444.
80. Cramer, in Schönke & Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch: Kommentar, (Beck: Muenchen 1997) 263. Absicht... liegt nur dann vor, wenn der Handlungswille des Täters final gerade auf den vom Gesetz bezeichneten Handlungserfolg gerichtet war.
81. See also Lackner, Strafgesetzbuch, (Beck: München 1991) 95;
82. Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 78, at 366.
83. Krey, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, vol. 2, supra note 57, at 109.
84. BGHSt 9, 146; 11, 173
85. (official collection of the Bundesgerichtshof "Federal Supreme Court" vol. 9, at 146; vol. 11 at 173);
86. Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 78, p. 367;
87. Jescheck & Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 67, at 297;
88. Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 74.
89. Code of Crimes against International Law adopted by both Chambers of the German Parliament, entered into force on 30 June 2002 "Vö lkerstrafgesetzbuch". The text of the Code, as adopted is to be found in the Official Gazette of Germany (Bundesgesetzblatt 2002, No. 42 at 2254).
90. Triffterer, 'Genocide. Its Particular Intent', supra note 90, at 405.
91. Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 74.
92. Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 44;
93. Lenckner in Schönke & Schröder, Strafrecht Kommentar, supra note 57, at 151.
94. Triffterer, 'Genocide: Its Particular Intent', supra note 90, at 402.
95. In determining that genocide occurred at Srebrenica the Krstić Appeals Chamber had this to say: "[...] the cardinal question is whether the intent to commit genocide existed. While this intent must be supported by the factual matrix, the offence of genocide does not require proof that the perpetrator chose the most efficient method to accomplish his objective of destroying the targeted group. Even where the method selected will not implement the perpetrator's intent to the fullest, leaving that destruction incomplete, this ineffectiveness alone does not preclude a finding of genocidal intent." See Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, (Case No. IT-98-33-A), Judgment, 19 April 2004, para. 32.
96. BGHSt 4, 108;
97. see also BGHSt 9, 144, and vol. 13 at 221.
98. Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 78, at 370, with references to other scholarly opinions.
99. Cramer, in Schönke & Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch: Kommentar, supra note 91, at 264. "Direkter Vorsatz liegt vor, wenn der Taeter sicheres Wissen davon hat, dass sein Verhalten die Voraussetzungen eines Strafgesetzes erfüllt";
100. Lackner, Strafgesetzbuch, supra note 91, p. 96;
101. Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 213.
102. Jescheck & Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 67, at 298 et seq.
103. Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 57, vol. 2, at 113; Jescheck & Weigend, supra note 67, at 299.
104. BGHSt 18, 264.
105. Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, vol. 2, supra note 57, at 115.
106. Roxin, Strafrecht, supra note 78, § 12, at 367 (Absicht [muss] nicht das Motiv, den Endzweck [...] bezeichnen, sondern liegt auch vor, wenn der erstrebte Erfolg weiteren oder anders gearteten Zielen des Täters dient).
107. BGHSt 21, 283 (vol. 21, at 283).
108. Dolus evantualis is a well known concept in most of the Continental law systems. This type of Vorsatz is recognized under the Italian criminal law as dolo eventuale. Pursuant to Article 43 of Italian Codice Penale all serious crimes require proof of the mental element known as dolo, which means that the prohibited result must be both preveduto (foreseen) and voluto (wanted). According to the Italian law, a result may be voluto even though it is not desired if, having contemplated the possibility of bringing it about by pursuing a course of conduct, the perpetrator is prepared to run the risk of doing so dolo eventuale. Even a small risk may be voluto if the defendant has reconciled himself to, or accepted it as a part of the price he was prepared to pay to secure his objective, see Finbarr McAuley & J. Paul McCutcheon, Criminal Liabilty (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), pp. 301-3.
109. The term "bedingter Vorsatz" (conditional intent) is, however, misleading, because it is not the intent which is conditional; on the contrary, a conditional has not yet reached the threshold of "intent", see Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 78, at 374. "Dolus eventualis, and especially its element of "will", are still a matter of dispute. On the one hand, case law concerning this element is inconsistent.... On the other hand, a considerable number of penal law scholars contend that dolus eventualis requires only an intellectual element, which most of them define as foresight of "concrete possibility"
110. see Heribert Schumann, 'Criminal Law' in Ebke & Finkin (eds.), Introduction to German Law, supra note 53, at 389-90.
111. Sometimes referred to as "luxuria", Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 216.
112. Schumann, 'Criminal Law', supra note 116, at 389.
113. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, supra note 90, pp. 445-46;
114. See also Mihajlo Acimovic, 'Conceptions of Culpability in Contemporary American Law', 26 Louisiana Law Review (1965) 28, 48 (describing a Romanist law test according to which the perpetrator acted intentionally if he could have said to himself: It may be either so or different, it may happen either so or differently; anyhow I shall act.)
115. For a different opinion see Paul T. Smith, 'Recklessness in Dolus Eventualis' 96 South African Law Journal (1979) 81 (criticizing South African law to the extent that it interprets dolus eventualis as indifference rather than foresight).
116. George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, supra note 90, at 446.
117. This concept of recklessness seems similar to the Model Penal Code's, which requires conscious awareness of a substantial risk. 122 BGHSt 7, 363
118. quoted in Krey, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, vol. 2, supra note 57, at 117.
119. BGHSt 7, 368-370.
120. Krey, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, vol. 2, supra note 57, at 119.
121. Bundesgerichtshof (German Supreme Court; hereinafter refer to as "BGH"), Case No. 5 StR 623/95 in "Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht - Rechtsprechungsreport" (hereinafter "NStZ-RR") p. 323 (East German soldier shooting (without direct intent to kill) refugee at the Berlin Wall pursuant to standing orders "to annihilate violators of the border" not guilty of homicide; officer reading said standing order to his troops on a daily basis not guilty of instigation to commit homicide);
122. BGH 5 StR 139/95 in "Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen" (Official Reporter of the German Supreme Court, decisions in criminal matters; hereinafter
123. "BGHSt") vol. 41 pp. 149-152 (same; also no co-perpetration by soldiers acting independently);
124. BGH 5 StR 88/93 in Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht" (hereinafter "NStZ") 1993 pp. 488-489; no instigation or aiding and abetting in acts of others);
125. BGH 2 StR 513/94 (same; also no liability for assault/battery if direct order to shoot given on the spot was not unlawful on its face);
126. BGH 2 StR 329/00 at: (no intentional homicide in pre-wall case of shootings at the intra-German border); generally
127. see further BGH 4 StR 271/99 in "Neue Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht" (hereinafter "NZV) pp. 88-89;
128. BGH 4 StR 642/95 in "Strafverteidiger" (hereinafter "StV") 1997 p. 7;
129. BGH 4 StR 275/96 in NStZ-RR 1996 pp. 355-356;
130. BGH4 StR 258/86 in NStZ 1987 pp. 284-285.
131. BGH NStZ 2000, 165 quoted in Greg Taylor, 'Concepts of Intention in German Criminal Law', 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2004) 99.
132. BGHSt 36, 1; 44, 99;
133. BGH NStZ (Neue Zeitschrift fuer Strafrecht) 1999 (year), p. 507;
134. BGH NStZ 2000, 583.
135. Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 76.
136. Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 78, at 376.
137. BGH St 7, 363, pp. 369, 370.
138. The indifference theory is supported by Cramer & Sternberg-Lieben in: Schönke-Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar, supra note 79, at 268 et seq. "dolus eventualis (ist) gegeben, wenn der Täter die Tatbestandsverwirklichung für möglich haelt und aus Gleichgültigkeit gegenueber dem geschuetzten Rechtsgut in Kauf nimmt."
139. Schmidhäuser, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, (1975) 89;
140. Jakobs, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1991) 269, 270.
141. See Lenckner, in: Schönke-Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch, supra note 57, at 240;
142. Jescheck & Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 67, at 302.
143. Krey, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, vol. 2, supra note 57, at 125.
144. Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 74.
145. Hellmuth Mayer, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1967) 121;
146. see also Jakobs, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 136, at 270.
147. H. Mayer, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1967) 121.
148. Reinhard von Frank, Strafgesetzbuch, (Tübingen: Mohr 1931), § 59.
149. Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 78, at 385: "Erkenntnismittel zur Feststellung des Vorsatzes".
150. Michaels, 'Acceptance: The Missing Mental State', supra note 88, at 1027.
151. It is to be noted that there are few more theories on dolus eventualis and its distinction from negligence. However, due to the lack of space, they could not be discussed in detail in this study. For instance, the "theory of the non-shielded danger" "Theorie des nicht abgeschirmten Risikos" by Herzberg, see Herzberg, 26 Juristische Schulung 249(1986), This theory tries to solve the problem via the element of causation. Dolus eventualis requires that the offender recognizes the danger and foresees the result as possible. Moreover, it must be a matter of luck and chance whether the result will occur or not. If, however, the danger was shielded in any way, the offender is only criminally liable for negligence. For example, if a teacher allows his students to swim in a dangerous river, ignoring or failing to notice a warning sign, and some students are injured, he is criminal liable for causing bodily harm by negligence. The "theory of the non-manifested will of avoidance" by Armin Kaufmann, according to this theory, an offender acts with dolus eventualis, if he took no efforts to avoid the occurrence of the result.
152. See Armin Kaufmann, Zeitschrift fuer die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 1958, 64, 73.
153. BGHSt 36, 1-20 [9-10].
154. Jescheck & Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 67, at 568.
155. Case is reproduced in: Deutscher Reichstag, Stenographische Berichte, at 2568 ff.;
156. see also Claud Mullins, The Leipzig Trials: An Account of the War Criminals' Trials and a Study of German Mentality (London 1921) at 151 ff.
157. Confirmed in BGH v. 7. 6. 1994-4 StR 105/94, reproduced in Strafverteidiger (StV) 1994, 654 (and BGH v. 22. 2. 2000-5 StR 573/99, reproduced in Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht - Rechtsprechungsreport (NStZ-RR) 2000, 165), quoted in Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Appeals Judgment, supra note 1, footnote 73.
158. Thus, German Criminal Code explicitly departs from what is referred to in the German literature as the theory of intent (Vorsatztheorie). This theory proposes to treat knowledge of unlawfulness and knowledge of other elements of a crime equally (e.g., factual elements) 'equal treatment doctrine'. Most notably this theory was overruled by § 17 of the StGB. For further details on the Vorsatztheorie and the 'equal treatment doctrine' see Gunther Arzt, 'The Problem of Mistake of Law', Brigham Young University Law Review (1986) 711, 714-716. In Common law systems, mistake of fact is recognised as a defence. Where the law requires intention or recklessness with respect to some element in the actus reus, a mistake, whether reasonable or not, will negate the mens rea and therefore will be considered as an excuse. Where the law requires only negligence, then only a reasonable mistake can afford a defence since an unreasonable mistake is itself a negligent act.
159. Gunther Arzt, 'Ignorance or Mistake of Law', 24 The American Journal of Comparative Law (1976) 646, 649. "In German, unlike Anglo-American law a mistake of fact, whether reasonable or not, precludes intent";
160. Nigel G. Foster, German Law and Legal System, (London: Blackstone Press Limited, 1993) 171. "Mistakes of fact includes the concept of intent, and thus the grounds of justification of consent or excuse (Irrtum über Entschuldigungsgründe). Thus, if intent is a necessary element of the crime, mistake of fact, whether reasonable or not, precludes convictions for intentional crimes, which are the most common traditional type of crime. The only other ground for criminal conviction under these circumstances is negligence, in those exceptional cases where the Criminal Code expressly prescribes punishment for negligent behaviour and does not include intent as a necessary element of the crime."
161. Formerly, mistake of facts and mistake of law were treated equally. The so-called "Vorsatztheorie" (theory of intent) proposed that the knowledge of the factual components of the offence and knowledge of the legal prohibition as such are equal elements within the concept of intent. An offender who lacks the knowledge of the legal prohibition has no consciousness of wrongdoing "Unrechtsbewusstsein" see, Arzt, 'Ignorance or Mistake of Law' supra note 154, at 653-4. This theory is, however, overruled by § 17 dStGB which provides that not the intent, but the culpability/guilt is excluded.
162. The Reichsgericht (court of the Reich) did not distinguish between mistake of fact and mistake of law; failure to know the law meant absence of intent. The mistake of law (error as to prohibition) was acknowledged by the Great Senate of the BGH in 1952 and was subsequently introduced in the Criminal Code as § 17 dStGB. BGH 2, 194(201); Jescheck & Weigend, supra note 67, at 452.
163. This issue could be easily understood by thinking of the insanity defence. As framed in most United States jurisdictions, that defence operates not by negating the intent element in the definition of an offence, but as an independent ground for denying culpability. The parallel in the context of the German mistake analysis is that mistake of law operates as an independent denial of culpability (Schuld). Most notably some States have narrowed the scope of the insanity defence by declaring it to be a defence only if it negates the intent element in the definition of the crime in question. For example, § 75-2-305 (Supp. 1985) of the Utah Code. This Code conceptualises the insanity defence as one that excludes intent rather than as a separate defence, see Arzt 'The Problem of Mistake of Law', supra note 155, at 714, footnote 8.
164. Foster, German Law & Legal System, supra note 156, at 17.
165. Matthias Neuner, 'General Principles of International Criminal Law in Germany', in Matthias Neuner (ed.), National Legislation Incorporating International Crimes, (Berlin: Berliner Wisseenchafts-Verlag 2003) 105, 120.
166. Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 82.
167. Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 78, at 406.
168. It is rare to find a material element of a purely descriptive character. Most of them have a double nature being both descriptive and normative. For instance, within criminal law the term "human being" requires a value judgment in order to determine at white time human life begins and at white time it ends. Hence, the beginning and the end of human life mark two borders (at what time human life begins and at what time it ends) this is considered as a normative legal element which requires a value judgment. Krey has observed that the legal term "taking away" as employed in § 242 StGB (theft) is of a completely normative nature, and accordingly, it does need of a value judgment, see Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 57, at 145.
169. "This is due to the psychological experience that the perception of a fact by the human senses must be transformed into a conceptual picture in order to be perceived as a definitional element of the crime." See Albin Eser, 'Mental Elements-Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law' in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, & John R. W. D. Jones (eds.), I The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: ACommentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 889, 921.
170. This is the prevailing scholarly opinion which is followed by the BGH (Federal Supreme Court of Justice) BGHSt 3, 248, 255.
171. See Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 57, at 141 footnote 125.
172. BGHSt 3, 248(255);
173. 4, 347(352), Jescheck & Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 67, at 295; Cramer & Sternberg-Lieben, in Schoenke & Schroeder, Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar, supra note 79, at 231.
174. Arzt, 'The Problem of Mistake of Law', supra note 155, at 716.
175. Jescheck & Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 67, at 311;
176. Cramer, in Schönke & Schröder, § 15 side number 59;
177. Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 84.
178. BGHSt 34, 55;
179. Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 78, at 437;
180. Jakobs, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 136, at 303;
181. Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 84.
182. Puppe, GA (Goldthammer's Archiv) 1981, p. 1.
183. Jescheck & Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 67, at 313.
184. H. Jescheck, Lerbuch des Strafrechts, Allgemeiner Teil, 3rd ed., (Berlin, 1978) at 245
185. et seq. the executions which they were carrying out were legal. This issue arose in the Amelo Trial (Trial of Otto Sandrock and three others 'Amelo Trial', 1945, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. I at 62-65, British Military Court).
186. BGHSt GrS (Great Senate), 2, 194(197).
187. Jescheck & Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 67, at 456.;
188. Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, § 11, side number 456 ff. at 160.
189. Ebke & Finkin, Introduction to German Law, supra note 53, at 395-96.
190. Only in case of special criminal law provisions which are not embodied in the German Criminal Code (StGB) but in specific statute law, the Courts seem to apply a less stricter standard; Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, p. 156;
191. but see Jescheck & Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 67, at 459. Some criminal law provisions not embodied in the Criminal Code might be interpreted as restricting criminal liability to positive knowledge of the prohibition.
192. BGH 2, 194(201).
193. BGH 5, 111(284); 121, 18.
194. BGH 20, 342(372); 40, 257(264).
195. Ebke & Finkin, Introduction to German Law, supra note 53, at 396.
196. Federal German Criminal Court, BGHSt 39, 35 quoted in Neuner, 'General Principles of International Criminal Law in Germany, supra note 161, at 122-23.
197. Federal German Criminal Court, BGHSt 44, 52(60) quoted in Neuner, 'General Principles of International Criminal Law in Germany, supra note 161, at 122.
198. See See Prosecutor v. Delalic et al. (Case No. IT-96-21-T), Prosecutor's Response to the Pre-Trial Briefs of the Accused, 14 April 1997, Section 5 'Mens rea', (on file with the author).
199. Mireille Delmas-Marty, 'The Contribution of Comparative Law to a Pluralist Conception of International Criminal Law', 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003) 13;
200. Michael Bohlander & Mark Findlay, 'The Use of Domestic Sources as a Basis for International Criminal Law', 2 The Global Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence (2002) 1;
201. Michael Bohlander, 'The Influence of Academic Research on the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia - A First Overview', 3 The Global Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence (2003) 195. The second survey on the subject will address the Mens rea concept in Islamic Law Sharia'a.