Intent, mistake of law, and co-perpetration in the lubanga decision on confirmation of charges

Journal of International Criminal Justice

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 471-487

  Weigend, Thomas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 49549087140     PISSN: 14781387     EISSN: 14781395     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jicj/mqn034     Document Type: Article

References (75)

1. Decision on Confirmation of Charges, Lubanga, PTC i, 29 January 2007 (iCC 01/04-01/06).
2. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, who was transferred to the ICC in March 2006, was a founder and prominent leader of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC), a group politically active since 2000 in ituri, a province in the North East of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). UPC had its base in one local ethnic group, the Hema, and received support from Rwandan officials. UPC competed for power with various other regional groups, some of them backed by Uganda and/or the central government of the DRC. The military wing of the UPC was called Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC). Lubanga also played a leading role in that military organisation, which in 2002 became engaged in armed conflict with rivalling groups in ituri - a conflict which continued through 2003 and which the Court characterizes as an international conflict, due to the direct intervention of Uganda and Rwanda till the middle of 2003.
3. K. Ambos, 'Some Preliminary Reflections on the Mens Rea Requirements of the Crimes of the iCC Statute and the Elements of Crimes', in L.C. Vohrah et al. (eds), Man's Inhumanity to Man (The Hague: Kluwer Law international, 2003) 11-40, at 11-12.
4. For details, see R. Clark, 'The Mental Element in international Criminal Law', 12 Criminal Law Forum (2001) 291 at 320-321.
5. For an argument in favour of that view, see G. Werle and F. Jeßberger, 'Unless Otherwise Provided', 3 JiCJ (2005) 35, at 43-46.
6. Lubanga, supra note 1, 3§57. The Chamber then goes on to explain that 'should have known' requires mere negligence, i.e., an ability to recognize the correct age with due diligence (ibid., 3§58).
7. ibid., 3§59.
8. ibid., 3§02.
9. Art. 77(2) First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1977, ratified by the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1982. The Chamber further refers to a decision of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman of 31 May 2004 (§§17-24) in which that Court held that the prohibition against recruiting child soldiers had crystallized as a customary law norm prior to November 1996
10. Lubanga, supra note 1, 3§11.
11. Lubanga, supra note 1, §§306, 312-314.
12. Art. 32(2) ICCSt.: 'A mistake of law as to whether a particular type of conduct is a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility.'
13. Since the age limit has specifically been written into the Statute any misconception as to what might be a 'child' soldier would be legally irrelevant.
14. Lubanga, supra note 1, 3§08.
15. ibid., 3§16, citing A. Eser, 'Mental Element - Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law', in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and R.J.W.D. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. A Commentary vol. i (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 889-948, at 941.
16. The prosecution seems not to have considered charges under the heading of superior responsibility (Art. 28 iCCSt.).
17. Judgment, Tadić (IT-94-1-A), Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999.
18. ibid., 1§90.
19. ibid., 1§96 et seq. The most controversial of the three variants of JCE is JCE iii, under which any member of a JCE is responsible as an intentional perpetrator for acts of other members of the JCE even if he or she did not foresee those acts, as long as they were 'a natural and foreseeable consequence' of the effecting of the common purpose: Tadić at 2§04.
20. For a recent critique, see J.D. Ohlin, 'Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise', 5 JiCJ (2007) 69, at 81 et seq.
21. For defences of the doctrine, see A. Cassese, 'The Proper Limits of individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise', 5 JiCJ (2007) 109, and
22. E. van Sliedregt, 'Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting individuals for Genocide', 5 JiCJ (2007) 184.
23. Judgment, Brdanin (IT-99-36-A), Appeals Chamber, 3 April 2007, §§410 et seq.
24. Tadić, supra note 16, 1§90.
25. Brdanin, supra note 19, 4§05.
26. Cf. Ohlin, supra note 18, at 85 et seq.
27. Lubanga, supra note 1, 3§25.
28. ibid., §§334-337.
29. With respect to Art. 25(3)(d) iCCSt. the Court speaks of a 'residual form of accessorial liability' (ibid., 337).
30. ibid., 3§29.
31. ibid., 3§30.
32. ibid., 3§32.
33. The French original is more precise: (Ils détiennent, avec d'autres personnes, le contrôle de l'infraction en raison des tâches essentielles qui leur ont été assignées); ibid., 3§32.
34. ibid., §§342, 347. The Court refers to a very similar definition of co-perpetration used by the iCTY: Judgment, Stakić (iT-97-24-T), Trial Chamber, 31 July 2003, 4§40 ('... they can only realise their plan insofar as they act together, but each individually can ruin the whole plan if he does not carry out his part. To this extent he is in control of the act', quoting C. Roxin, Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft (6th ed, Berlin, 1994), 278).
35. Lubanga, supra note 1, 3§48.
36. See the list of authorities cited in Lubanga, ibid., 3§48, footnote 425.
37. For a 'classic' decision along those lines, see Reichsgericht (Imperial Court), Judgment of 19 February 1940, 74 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen, 84. In that decision, the Court convicted a woman who drowned her sister's baby in a bathtub on her sister's request of being an accessory (aider and abetter) to homicide because she lacked animus auctoris. More recent jurisprudence still adheres to a subjective starting point but uses objective factors (such as the amount of 'domination' of the criminal act) to determine the actor's animus.
38. See, for example, Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Appeals), Judgment of 7 May 1996, [1996] Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht, 434.
39. For further jurisprudence, see W. Joecks, in K. Miebach and W. Joecks (eds), 1 Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2003), 2§5 notes 21 et seq.
40. See cases cited and evaluated by B. Schünemann, in H.W. Laufhütte, R. Rissing-van Saan and K. Tiedemann (eds), 1 Strafgesetzbuch. Leipziger Kommentar (12th edn, Berlin: De Gruyter Recht, 2007), 2§5 notes 28-30, at 181.
41. See, e.g. T. Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze (55th edn. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2008), 2§5 notes 12, 12a
42. J. Wessels and W. Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil (37th edn, Heidelberg: Müller, 2007), note 518.
43. See, e.g. B. Schünemann, ibid., 2§5 notes 182-184, at 188.
44. For a similar position in German literature, see G. Stratenwerth and L. Kuhlen, i Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil (5th edn, Cologne: Heymanns, 2004), 290.
45. The Chamber understands this requirement to be an objective one; Lubanga, supra note 1, 3§43. But it recognizes that the agreement need not be explicit and can be inferred from concerted action (ibid., 3§45). The gist of the 'agreement' then is the subjective meeting of minds, not any overt common action. I would therefore characterize this as a subjective element.
46. ibid., 3§51: 'The cumulative reference to "intent" and "knowledge" requires the existence of a volitional element on the part of the suspect.'
47. For a discussion of the status of dolus eventualis in international criminal law see A. Cassese, international Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 168 et seq.
48. Lubanga, supra note 1, 3§44.
49. ibid., 3§66, 367.
50. ibid., 3§52 (i).
51. ibid., 3§52 (ii). In the original French version, this passage reads: '...des situations dans lesquelles le suspect a) est conscient du risque que les éléments objectifs du crime résultent de ses actions ou omissions et b) accepte ce résultat en s'y résignant ou en l'admettant...' 'En s'y résigant' is a psychological attitude quite far removed from 'intending' or 'willing' a consequence of one's actions to occur.
52. For support of this far-reaching extension of 'intent', the Chamber refers to the iCTY Trial Chamber decision in Stakić, supra note 29, 5§87. But the Stakić Chamber in that passage only interpreted the concept of dolus eventualis, a concept which it felt free to apply because of course it was not bound by the 'intent and knowledge' language of Art. 30(1) iCCSt.
53. For an evaluation of the iCTY's mens rea jurisprudence see W.A. Schabas, 'Mens Rea and the international Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 New England Law Review (2003) 1015
54. for an overview of various mens rea problems in international law see J.D. Van der Vyver, 'The international Criminal Court and the Concept of Mens Rea in international Criminal Law', 12 University of Miami international and Comparative Law Review (2004) 57.
55. ibid., 3§53.
56. K. Ambos, Internationales Strafrecht (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2006), 157-158 (knowledge on the basis of general life experience; 'relative certainty' as to bringing about the consequence)
57. A. Eser, supra note 14, at 917-918 ('if nothing surprising intervenes')
58. G. Werle, Völkerstrafrecht (2nd edn, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), note 367 (excluding only 'extraordinary circumstances').
59. Werle, ibid., note 368, likewise supports the decision, claiming that it corrects the misguided formulation of Art. 30 iCCSt.
60. Lubanga, supra note 1, 3§54.
61. ibid., 3§54 footnote 436 (citing Stakić, supra note 29, 5§87).
62. Lubanga, supra note 1, 3§55 footnote 437. The Chamber gives the example of a speeding taxi driver who 'trusts' that nothing can happen due to his driving experience.
63. In the French original: 'le suspect doit avoir manifestement ... accepté l'idée que ces éléments objectifs puissent résulter de ses actes ou omissions.' (ibid., 3§54).
64. The Lubanga Chamber emphasizes that 'recklessness' is not a recognized mode of responsibility under Art. 30 iCCSt., characterizing 'recklessness' as lacking the offender's reconciling himself' with the result of his action: Lubanga, supra note 1, 3§55 footnote 438.
65. ibid., 3§53.
66. Ibid., 3§65.
67. Ibid., 4§04.
68. Ibid., 3§77.
69. Ibid., 3§44.
70. Ibid., 3§77 (ii).
71. Ibid., 3§79 (vii), (ix).
72. Ibid., 3§83 (ii).
73. Ibid., 3§83 (ii), (iii).
74. Ibid., 4§03.
75. Ibid., 3§98.