Game theory meets threshold analysis: Reappraising the paradoxes of anarchy and revolution

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Volumn 59, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 579-617

  Vanderschraaf, Peter ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 57249090857     PISSN: 00070882     EISSN: 14643537     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axn025     Document Type: Article

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