Follow the leader: Local interactions with influence neighborhoods

Philosophy of Science

Volumn 72, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 86-113

  Vanderschraaf, Peter ^a   Alexander, J McKenzie ^b  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 20744440537     PISSN: 00318248     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/428077     Document Type: Review

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