Protective governance choices and the value of acquisition activity

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 14, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 550-566

  Bauguess, Scott ^a   Stegemoller, Mike ^b  

^a TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Acquisitions; Family; Governance; Ownership; Shareholder Rights

Indexed keywords

EID: 56349112062     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.09.011     Document Type: Article

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