(Non)behavioral economics: A programmatic assessment

Journal of Psychology

Volumn 216, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 244-253

  Güth, Werner ^a,b  

^a Department of Archaeology   (Germany)

^b Institute of Economics   (Germany)

Author keywords

(Cognitive) psychology; (Un)bounded rationality; Evolution; Game theory; Learning; Satisficing

Indexed keywords

EID: 56049122202     PISSN: 00443409     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1027/0044-3409.216.4.244     Document Type: Review

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