Games of competition in a stochastic environment

Theory and Decision

Volumn 59, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 255-294

  Avrahami, Judith ^a   Güth, Werner ^b   Kareev, Yaakov ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN HISTORY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Equilibrium; Impulse balance; Maximin behavior; Probability matching; Reinforcement learning; Species competition; Stochastic zero sum games

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; GAME THEORY; LEARNING SYSTEMS; PROBABILITY;

EQUILIBRIUM; IMPULSE BALANCE; MAXIMUM BEHAVIOR; PROBABILITY MATCHING; REINFORCEMENT LEARNING; SPECIES COMPETITION;

RANDOM PROCESSES;

EID: 28844447776     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: 15737187     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-005-2883-y     Document Type: Article

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