Stocks or options? Moral hazard, firm viability, and the design of compensation contracts

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 451-482

  Kadan, Ohad ^a   Swinkels, Jeroen M ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 55549132341     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhm077     Document Type: Article

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