Leverage decision and manager compensation with choice of effort and volatility

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 73, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 71-92

  Cadenillas, Abel ^a   Cvitanić, Jakša ^b   Zapatero, Fernando ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Capital structure; Principal agent; Stochastic control

Indexed keywords

EID: 3042689399     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.06.003     Document Type: Article

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