Screening when some agents are nonstrategic: Does a monopoly need to exclude?

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 816-840

  Severinov, Sergei ^a   Deneckere, Raymond ^b  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34748879415     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00059.x     Document Type: Article

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