Moral hazard, insurance, and some collusion

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 50, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 225-247

  Alger, Ingela ^a   Albert Ma, Ching To ^a,b,c  

^a BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

^b Boston University   (United States)

^c HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

Honesty and dishonesty; Insurance; Moral hazard; Optimal contracts

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037290078     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00049-5     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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