How to organize crime

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 75, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 1039-1067

  Baccara, Mariagiovanna ^a   Bar Isaac, Heski ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CRIME; DETECTION METHOD; LAW ENFORCEMENT; SOCIAL POLICY; TRADE-OFF;

EID: 51749118213     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00508.x     Document Type: Article

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