Optimal cartel pricing in the presence of an antitrust authority

International Economic Review

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 145-169

  Harrington Jr , Joseph E ^a  

^a JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 27744451842     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: 14682354     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0020-6598.2005.00313.x     Document Type: Article

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