A theory of trade secrets in firms

International Economic Review

Volumn 43, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 831-855

  Zábojník, Ján ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036687274     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00037     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. Capital rationing and organizational slack in capital budgeting
2. Keeping secrets
3. Law enforcement, malfeasance and compensation of enforcers
4. The production of human capital and the life cycle of earnings
5. Strategic promotion and compensation
6. Callaway defector wins case; Court says company can't make him stay
7. Worker cooperation and the ratchet effect
8. Inter-industry wage differences and industry characteristics
9. Some economics of trade secret law
10. Careers in organizations: Theory and evidence
11. A theory of wage and promotion dynamics inside firms
12. A theory of wage dynamics
13. The capital budgeting process: Incentives and information
14. Moral hazard and observability
15. Managerial incentives and capital management
16. Firm-specific capital and turnover
17. The complexity of compensation contracts
18. Reflections on the inter-industry wage structure
19. Why is there mandatory retirement?
20. Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts
21. Economic espionage act: A whole new ball game
22. A market theory of job assignment and sequential accumulation of information
23. Reputation and hierarchy in dynamic models of employment
24. Experience, performance, and earnings
25. Are those paid more really more productive?
26. Authority, control, and the distribution of earnings
27. Inside directors, board effectiveness, and shareholder wealth
28. Self-selection and turnover in the labor market
29. The enemy within
30. Job assignments, signaling and efficiency
31. Worker allocation, hierarchies and the wage distribution
32. Cybercrime against business frequent, costly