Proportional representation with citizen candidates

Public Choice

Volumn 103, Issue 3-4, 2000, Pages 205-230

  Hamlin, Alan ^a   Hjortlund, Michael ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

^b AALBORG UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034390326     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1005086519491     Document Type: Article

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