Strategic candidacy and voting procedures

Econometrica

Volumn 69, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 1013-1037

  Dutta, Bhaskar ^a   Jackson, Matthew O ^b   Le Breton, Michel ^c  

^a INDIAN STATISTICAL INSTITUTE   (India)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^c Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

Author keywords

Candidates; Strategic candidacy; Voting procedures; Voting rules

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008682032     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00228     Document Type: Article

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