On the competition of asymmetric agents

German Economic Review

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 373-395

  Harbring, Christine ^a   Lünser, Gabriele K ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Experiments; Heterogeneity; Sorting; Tournament design; Work incentives

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); EMPLOYMENT; PREDICTION; PRICE DETERMINATION; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 48649097968     PISSN: 14656485     EISSN: 14680475     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0475.2008.00438.x     Document Type: Article

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