Relative deprivation in rank-order tournaments

Labour Economics

Volumn 7, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 385-407

  Kräkel, Matthias ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

C72; J31; J33; J41; Personnel policies; Rank order tournaments; Relative deprivation; Sabotage

Indexed keywords

EID: 0011322640     PISSN: 09275371     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0927-5371(00)00009-9     Document Type: Article

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