Dual reduction and elementary games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 21, Issue 1-2, 1997, Pages 183-202

  Myerson, Roger B ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031256580     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0573     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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5. Myerson R. B. Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria. Int. J. Game Theory. 15:1986;133-154.
6. Nash J. F. Noncooperative Games. Ann. Math. 54:1951;289-295.
7. Nau R. F., McCardle K. F. Coherent Behavior in Noncooperative Games. J. Econ. Theory. 50:1990;424-444.
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9. Selten R. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. Int. J. Game Theory. 4:1975;25-55.
10. van Damme E. Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria. 1991;Springer-Verlag, Berlin.