Nash equilibria via polynomial equations

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2976, Issue , 2004, Pages 413-422

  Lipton, Richard J ^a,b   Markakis, Evangelos ^a  

^a GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b TELCORDIA TECHNOLOGIES   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATION THEORY; COMPUTER GAMES; GAME THEORY; POLYNOMIALS; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

ALGEBRAIC NUMBERS; APPROXIMATE EQUILIBRIUMS; EXCHANGE MODELS; MARKET EQUILIBRIA; NASH EQUILIBRIA; POLYNOMIAL EQUATION; RUNNING TIME; SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION;

PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS;

EID: 34250216976     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-24698-5_45     Document Type: Article

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