In defense of comparative statics: Specifying empirical tests of models of strategic interaction

Political Analysis

Volumn 15, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 465-482

  Carrubba, Clifford J ^a   Yuen, Amy ^a   Zorn, Christopher ^b  

^a EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 35648959729     PISSN: 10471987     EISSN: 14764989     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/pan/mpm008     Document Type: Article

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