On formal theory and statistical methods: A response to Carrubba, Yuen, and Zorn

Political Analysis

Volumn 15, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 483-501

  Signorino, Curtis S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 35649028675     PISSN: 10471987     EISSN: 14764989     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/pan/mpm027     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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3. Bas, Muhammet Ali. 2007. Democratic inefficiency: Regime type and the tendency to make foreign policy mistakes. Working paper. University of Rochester.
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