Non-excludable public good experiments

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 49, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 81-102

  Cason, Timothy N ^a   Saijo, Tatsuyoshi ^b,c   Yamato, Takehiko ^d   Yokotani, Konomu ^e  

^a PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b OSAKA UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^c TRADE AND INDUSTRY   (Japan)

^d TOKYO INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Japan)

^e Research and Survey Department   (Japan)

Author keywords

Fairness; Hawk Dove game; Laboratory; Social preferences; Spite; Voluntary contribution mechanism

Indexed keywords

EID: 4344589457     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.11.002     Document Type: Article

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