A Voluntary Participation Game with a Non-excludable Public Good

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 84, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 227-242

  Saijo, Tatsuyoshi ^a,b   Yamato, Takehiko ^c  

^a OSAKA UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^b JAPAN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGENCY   (Japan)

^c TOKYO METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007264320     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2476     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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