Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase Theorem?

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 76, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 309-335

  Dixit, Avinash ^a   Olson, Mancur ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

D71; H11; H41; Public goods, Coase Theorem

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000482432     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00089-4     Document Type: Article

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