The Groves-Ledyard mechanism: An experimental study of institutional design

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 59, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 335-364

  Chen, Yan ^a   Plott, Charles R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Design; Mechanisms; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030095311     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01506-X     Document Type: Article

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