Towards micropolitical foundations of public finance

European Economic Review

Volumn 42, Issue 3-5, 1998, Pages 685-694

  Persson, Torsten ^a   Roland, Gérard ^b   Tabellini, Guido ^c  

^a STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^b FREE UNIVERSITY OF BRUSSELS   (Belgium)

^c BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

Author keywords

Comparative politics; Incentives; Political economics; Rents

Indexed keywords

EID: 0013370756     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00145-1     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Baron, D., 1997. Comparative dynamics of parliamentary government. Mimeo. Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
2. Baron, D., Ferejohn, J., 1989. Bargaining in legislatures. American Political Science Review 83, 1181-1206.
3. Diermeier, D., Feddersen, T., 1996. Disciplined coalitions and redistribution: The effect of the vote of confidence procedure on legislative bargaining. Mimeo. Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.
4. Ferejohn, J., 1986. Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public Choice 50, 5-26.
5. Fershtmann, C., Judd, K., Kalai, E., 1991. Observable contracts: Strategic delegation and cooperation. International Economic Review 32, 551-559.
6. Persson, T., 1997. Economic policy and special interest politics. Economic Journal, 112, 1163-1202.
7. Persson, T., Roland, G., Tabellini, G., 1997a. Separation of powers and political accountability. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 1163-1202.
8. Persson, T., Roland, G., Tabellini G., 1997b. Comparative politics and public finance. Mimeo. Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.