Party governance and ideological bias

European Economic Review

Volumn 43, Issue 4-6, 1999, Pages 779-789

  Caillaud, B ^a,b   Tirole, J ^a,c,d  

^a ENCP CERAS   (France)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c Toulouse School of Economics   (France)

^d MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Democratic institutions; Internal organization; Parties

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; ELECTION; IDEOLOGY; ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK;

EID: 0032798549     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00093-2     Document Type: Article

References (7)

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