How to play the ultimatum game: An engineering approach to metanormativity

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 173-192

  Hardy Vallée, Benoit ^a   Thagard, Paul ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Decision; Naturalism; Neuroeconomics; Normativity; Rationality

Indexed keywords

EID: 42649092562     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: 1465394X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515080801976581     Document Type: Article

References (72)

1. Baron-Cohen, S., & Belmonte, M. K. (2005). Autism: A window onto the development of the social and the analytic brain. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 28(1), 109-126.
2. Bermúdez, J. L. (2002). Rationality without language. In J. L. Bermúdez & A. Millar (Eds.), Reason and nature: Essays in the theory of rationality (pp. 233-264). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000). ERC: A Theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. The American Economic Review, 90(1), 166-193.
4. Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2002). Behavioural science: Homo reciprocans. Nature, 415(6868), 125-128.
5. Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2004). The evolution of strong reciprocity: Cooperation in heterogeneous populations. Theoretical Population Biology, 65(1), 17-28.
6. Brockner, J. (2006). Why it's so hard to be fair. Harvard Business Review, 54(3), 122-129.
7. de Quervain, D. J., Fischbacher, U., Treyer, V., Schellhammer, M., Schnyder, U., Buck, A., et al. (2004). The neural basis of altruistic punishment. Science, 305(5688), 1254-1258.
8. Diener, E., Diener, M., & Diener, C. (1995). Factors predicting the subjective well-being of nations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69(5), 851-864.
9. Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2004). A theory of sequential reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 47(2), 268-298.
10. Ernst, M. O., & Bulthoff, H. H. (2004). Merging the senses into a robust percept. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(4), 162-169.
11. Falk, A., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003). On the nature of fair behavior. Economic Inquiry, 41(1), 20-26.
12. Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003). The nature of human altruism. Nature, 425(6960), 785-791.
13. Falk, A., & Fischbacher, U. (2006). A theory of reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 54(2), 293-315.
14. Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), 817-868.
15. Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (2003). Theories of fairness and reciprocity-Evidence and economic applications. In M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen, & S. Turnovsky (Eds.), Advances in economic theory, Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society (pp. 208-257). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
16. Frank, R. H., Gilovich, T., & Regan, D. T. (1993). Does studying economics inhibit cooperation?. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(2), 159-171.
17. Frege, G. (1884/1980). The foundations of arithmetic: A logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number (2nd rev. ed.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
18. Geisler, W. S., & Kerten, D. (2002). Illusions, perception and Bayes. Nature Neuroscience, 5(6), 508-510.
19. Gepshtein, S., & Banks, M. S. (2003). Viewing geometry determines how vision and haptics combine in size perception. Current Biology, 13(6), 483-488.
20. Gilbert, D. T. (2006). Stumbling on happiness (1st ed.). New York: A.A. Knopf.
21. Gintis, H. (2000). Strong reciprocity and human sociality. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 206(2), 169-179.
22. Goldman, A. I. (1992). Liaisons: Philosophy meets the cognitive and social sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
23. Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982). An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3(4), 367-388.
24. Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 262(3859), 1243-1248.
25. Hardy-Vallée, B. (2007). Decision-making: A neuroeconomic perspective. Philosophy Compass, 2(6), 939-953.
26. Hempel, C. G. (1961). Rational action. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 35, 5-23.
27. Henrich, J. (2000). Does culture matter in economic behavior? Ultimatum game bargaining among the machiguenga of the peruvian amazon. The American Economic Review, 90(4), 973-979.
28. Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., et al. (2005). "Economic man" In cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. Behavioral and Brain Science, 28(6), 795-815; Discussion 815-855.
29. Hill, E., & Sally, D. (2002). Dilemmas and bargains: Theory of mind, cooperation and fairness. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract= 407040 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.407040.
30. Hoffman, E., McCabe, K. A., & Smith, V. L. (1996). On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games. International Journal of Game Theory, 25(3), 289-301.
31. Holyoak, K. J., & Thagard, P. (1995). Mental leaps: Analogy in creative thought. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
32. Huck, S., & Oechssler, J. (1999). The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair allocations. Games and Economic Behavior, 28, 13-24.
33. Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental models: Towards a cognitive science of language, inference, and consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
34. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263-291.
35. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (2000). Choices, values, and frames. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
36. Kim, J. (1988). What is naturalized epistemology? In J. E. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical perspectives (vol. 2, pp. 381-406). Asascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
37. Koen, B. V. (2003). Discussion of the method: Conducting the engineer's approach to problem solving. New York: Oxford University Press.
38. Kroes, P. (1998). Technology, philosophy of. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Retrieved December 12, 2007, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/Q103SECT3. London: Routledge.
39. Kording, K. P., & Wolpert, D. M. (2006). Bayesian decision theory in sensorimotor control. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(7), 319-326.
40. Landy, M. S., & Kojima, H. (2001). Ideal cue combination for localizing texture-defined edges. Journal of the Optical Society of America A: Optics, Image Science, and Vision, 18(9), 2307-2320.
41. Ledyard, J. O. (1995). Public goods: A survey of experimental research. In J. H. Kagel & A. E. Roth (Eds.), Handbook of experimental economics (pp. 111-194). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
42. Luce, R. D., & Raiffa, H. (1957). Games and decisions: Introduction and critical survey. New York: Wiley.
43. Maloney, L. T. (2002). Statistical decision theory and biological vision. In D. Heyer & R. Mausfeld (Eds.), Perception and the physical world: Psychological and philosophical issues in perception (pp. 145-189). New York: Wiley.
44. McDowell, J. (1985). Functionalism and anomalous monism. In E. LePore & B. McLaughlin (Eds.), Actions and events: Essays on the philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Blackwell.
45. McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and world. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
46. Müsch, H., & Buus, S. (2001). Using statistical decision theory to predict speech intelligibility. I. Model structure. The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 109, 2896-2909.
47. Nash, J. F. (1953). Two-person cooperative games. Econometrica, 21(1), 128-140.
48. Oosterbeek, H., Sloof, R., & van de Kuilen, G. (2004). Cultural differences in ultimatum game experiments: Evidence from a meta-analysis. Experimental Economics, 7(2), 171-188.
49. Pablo, B.-G., Ramón, C.-R., & Almudena, D. (2006). "Si él lo necesita": Gypsy fairness in Vallecas. Experimental Economics, V9(3), 253-264.
50. Peacocke, C. (1992). A study of concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
51. Quine, W. V. (1978). A postscript on metaphor. Critical Inquiry, 5(1), 161-162.
52. Quine, W. V. O. (1986). Reply to Morton White. In L. E. Hahn & P. A. Schilpp (Eds.), The philosophy of W. V. Quine (pp. 663-665). La Salle, MA: Open Court.
53. Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. The American Economic Review, 83(5), 1281-1302.
54. Rasmussen, D. B., & Den Uyl, D. J. (2005). Norms of liberty: A perfectionist basis for non-perfectionist politics. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
55. Rilling, J. K., Gutman, D. A., Zeh, T. R., Pagnoni, G., Berns, G. S., & Kilts, C. D. (2002). A neural basis for social cooperation. Neuron, 35(2), 395-405.
56. Robert, C., & Camevale, P. J. (1997). Group choice in ultimatum bargaining. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 72(2), 256-279.
57. Sally, D. (1995). Conversations and cooperation in social dilemmas: A meta-analysis of experiments from 1958 to 1992. Rationality and Society, 7, 58-92.
58. Samuels, R., Stich, S., & Faucher, L. (2004). Reason and rationality. In I. Niiniluoto, M. Sintonen, & J. Wolenski (Eds.), Handbook of epistemology (pp. 131-179). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher.
59. Samuelson, L. (2005). Economic theory and experimental economics. Journal of Economic Literature, 43, 65-107.
60. Sanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2003). The neural basis of economic decision-making in the ultimatum game. Science, 300(5626), 1755-1758.
61. Savage, L. J. (1954). The foundations of statistics. New York: Wiley.
62. Scharff, R. C., & Dusek, V. (2003). Philosophy of technology: The technological condition. An anthology. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
63. Stein, E. (1996). Without good reason: The rationality debate in philosophy and cognitive science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
64. Stueber, K. R. (2006). Rediscovering empathy: Agency, folk psychology, and the human sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
65. Thagard, P. (2000). Coherence in thought and action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
66. Trommershäuser, J., Maloney, L. T., & Landy, M. S. (2003a). Statistical decision theory and tradeoffs in the control of motor response. Spatial Vision, 16, 255-275.
67. Trommershäuser, J., Maloney, L. T., & Landy, M. S. (2003b). Statistical decision theory and the selection of rapid, goal-directed movements. Journal of the Optical Society of America A: Optics, Image Science, and Vision, 20(7), 1419-1433.
68. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and psychology of choice. Science, 211, 453-458.
69. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1986). Rational choice and the framing of decisions. The Journal of Business, 59(4), 251-278.
70. van't Wout, M., Kahn, R. S., Sanfey, A. G., & Aleman, A. (2006). Affective state and decisionmaking in the ultimatum game. Experimental Brain Research, 169(4), 564-568.
71. Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of games and economic behavior (3rd ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
72. Weiss, Y., Simoncelli, E. P., & Adelson, E. H. (2002). Motion illusions as optimal percepts. Nature Neuroscience, 5(6), 598-604.