Folk fears about freedom and responsibility: Determinism vs. reductionism

Journal of Cognition and Culture

Volumn 6, Issue 1-2, 2006, Pages 215-237

  Nahmias, Eddy ^a  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33747887940     PISSN: 15677095     EISSN: 15685373     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/156853706776931295     Document Type: Review

References (14)

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2. LEWIS, D. 1981 Are we free to break the laws? Theoria 47: 113-121
3. KANE, R. 1999 Responsibility, luck, and chance: reflections on free will and indeterminism. Journal of Philosophy 96: 217-240
4. KIM, J. 1998 Mind in a Physical World. Cambridge: MIT Press
5. NAHMIAS, E., MORRIS, S., NADELHOFFER, T. & TURNER, J. 2004 The phenomenology of free will. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(7-8): 162-179
6. 2005 Surveying freedom: folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. Philosophical Psychology 18: 561-584
7. 2006 Is incompatibilism intuitive? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
8. NICHOLS, S. 2004 The folk psychology of free will. Mind and Language 19: 473-502
9. NICHOLS, S. AND KNOBE, J. in prep. Moral responsibility and determinism: empirical investigations of folk intuitions
10. TAYLOR, R. 1963 Metaphysics. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall
11. TURNER, J. AND NAHMIAS, E. forthcoming Are the folk agent-causationists? Mind and Language
12. VAN INWAGEN, P. 1975 The incompatibility of free will and determinism. In Watson, G. (ed.) Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 46-58
13. VAN INWAGEN, P. 1983 An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press
14. WOLF, S. 1990 Freedom within Reason. New York: Oxford University Press