A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignalling

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 38, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 1020-1043

  Araujo, Aloisio ^a   Gottlieb, Daniel ^b   Moreira, Humberto ^a  

^a FUNDAÇÃO GETÚLIO VARGAS   (Brazil)

^b MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 41749100404     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00124.x     Document Type: Article

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