Too cool for school? Signalling and countersignalling

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 33, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 630-649

  Feltovich, Nick ^a   Harbaugh, Richmond ^b   To, Ted ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036990956     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3087478     Document Type: Article

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