Formal proofs of cryptographic security of Diffie-Hellman-based protocols

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4912 LNCS, Issue , 2008, Pages 312-329

  Roy, Arnab ^a   Datta, Anupam ^b   Mitchell, John C ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL; PROTOCOL STANDARDS;

AUTHENTICATION; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; STANDARDS; THEOREM PROVING;

CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 41549086014     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-78663-4_21     Document Type: Conference Paper

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