Inductive proofs of computational secrecy

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4734 LNCS, Issue , 2007, Pages 219-234

  Roy, Arnab ^a   Datta, Anupam ^b   Derek, Ante ^a   Mitchell, John C ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AUTHENTICATION; COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; DATA TRANSFER; NETWORK SECURITY; POLYNOMIALS;

COMPUTATIONAL AUTHENTICATION; INDUCTIVE PROOF SYSTEMS; INDUCTIVE PROOFS;

NETWORK PROTOCOLS;

EID: 38049030237     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-74835-9_15     Document Type: Conference Paper

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