Computationally sound compositional logic for key exchange protocols

Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 321-334

  Datta, Anupam ^a   Derek, Ante ^a   Mitchell, John C ^a   Warinschi, Bogdan ^b  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

^b LORIA   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL SEMANTICS; FORMAL PROOF RULES; KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOLS;

BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS; CRYPTOGRAPHY; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; POLYNOMIALS; PROBABILISTIC LOGICS; SEMANTICS;

FORMAL LOGIC;

EID: 33947704230     PISSN: 10636900     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2006.9     Document Type: Conference Paper

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