Limits of the BRSIM/UC soundness of Dolev-Yao models with hashes

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4189 LNCS, Issue , 2006, Pages 404-423

  Backes, Michael ^a   Pfitzmann, Birgit ^b   Waidner, Michael ^b  

^a SAARLAND UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b IBM RESEARCH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGEBRA; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; PROBABILISTIC LOGICS; SECURITY SYSTEMS; THEOREM PROVING;

AUTOMATED TOOLS; PROBABILISTIC HASHING;

CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 33750265393     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/11863908_25     Document Type: Conference Paper

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