Does resorting to online dispute resolution promote agreements? Experimental evidence

European Economic Review

Volumn 52, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 259-282

  Gabuthy, Yannick ^a   Jacquemet, Nicolas ^b   Marchand, Nadège ^c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LOUIS PASTEUR   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON SORBONNE   (France)

^c UNIVERSITÉ LUMIÈRE LYON 2   (France)

Author keywords

Arbitration; Bargaining; Electronic commerce; Experimental economics; Online dispute resolution

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; DISPUTE RESOLUTION; INTERNET;

EID: 38949214689     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.04.004     Document Type: Article

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