The spite motive and equilibrium behavior in auctions

Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2003, Pages

  Morgan, John ^a,c   Steiglitz, Ken ^b,d   Reis, George ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^d Princeton University   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Behavior; Spite

Indexed keywords

EID: 0344705995     PISSN: 15380645     EISSN: 15380645     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1538-0645.1102     Document Type: Article

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