Competence implies credibility

American Economic Review

Volumn 97, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 37-63

  Moscarini, Giuseppe ^a  

^a NONE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 35448938452     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.1.37     Document Type: Article

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