Generalized trade reduction mechanisms

EC'07 - Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 20-29

  Gonen, Mira ^a   Gonen, Rica ^b   Pavlov, Elan ^c  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b YAHOO RESEARCH   (United States)

^c MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Budget balance; External competition; Internal competition; Trade reduction

Indexed keywords

BUDGET BALANCE; EXTERNAL COMPETITION; INTERNAL COMPETITION; TRADE REDUCTION;

BUDGET CONTROL; COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; SOCIAL ASPECTS; SUPPLY CHAINS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 36448975481     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1250910.1250914     Document Type: Conference Paper

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