Public policy with endogenous preferences

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 7, Issue 5, 2005, Pages 841-857

  Bar Gill, Oren ^a   Fershtman, Chaim ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38349034223     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2005.00248.x     Document Type: Article

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