A biological basis for expected and non-expected utility

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 68, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 397-424

  Robson, Arthur J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030078496     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0023     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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