When will payoff maximization survive? An indirect evolutionary analysis

Journal of Evolutionary Economics

Volumn 11, Issue 5, 2001, Pages 479-499

  Güth, Werner ^a   Peleg, Bezalel ^b  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN HISTORY   (Germany)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

(Indirect) evolution; Endogenous preferences; Incomplete information; Rationality

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035643943     PISSN: 09369937     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s191-001-8318-2     Document Type: Article

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