Institutions and economic change: A critical survey of the new institutional approaches and empirical evidence

Journal of Socio-Economics

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 416-443

  Gagliardi, Francesca ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HERTFORDSHIRE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Economic change; Institutional analysis; Institutions

Indexed keywords

EID: 37749050213     PISSN: 10535357     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2007.03.001     Document Type: Article

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