Path dependence in historical sociology

Theory and Society

Volumn 29, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 507-548

  Mahoney, James ^a  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034345564     PISSN: 03042421     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1007113830879     Document Type: Article

References (259)

1. Ronald Aminzade, “Historical Sociology and Time,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 462-467; Larry J. Griffin, “Temporality, Events, and Explanation in Historical Sociology: An Introduction,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 413-414; Larry J. Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure, and Causal Interpretation in Historical Sociology,” American Journal of Sociology 98 (1993): 1099; Larry W. Isaac, “Transforming Localities: Reflections on Time, Causality, and Narrative in Contemporary Historical Sociology,” Historical Methods 30 (1997): 7; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology,” in Terrence J. McDonald, editor. The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 262-264; Margaret R. Somers, “We’re No Angels: Realism, Rational Choice, and Relationility in Social Science,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 768-769; Charles Tilly, “Future History,” Theory and Society 17/6 (1988): 710; Charles Tilly, “The Time of States,” Social Research 61 (1994): 270.
2. Ronald Aminzade, “Historical Sociology and Time,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 462-467; Larry J. Griffin, “Temporality, Events, and Explanation in Historical Sociology: An Introduction,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 413-414; Larry J. Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure, and Causal Interpretation in Historical Sociology,” American Journal of Sociology 98 (1993): 1099; Larry W. Isaac, “Transforming Localities: Reflections on Time, Causality, and Narrative in Contemporary Historical Sociology,” Historical Methods 30 (1997): 7; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology,” in Terrence J. McDonald, editor. The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 262-264; Margaret R. Somers, “We’re No Angels: Realism, Rational Choice, and Relationility in Social Science,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 768-769; Charles Tilly, “Future History,” Theory and Society 17/6 (1988): 710; Charles Tilly, “The Time of States,” Social Research 61 (1994): 270.
3. Ronald Aminzade, “Historical Sociology and Time,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 462-467; Larry J. Griffin, “Temporality, Events, and Explanation in Historical Sociology: An Introduction,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 413-414; Larry J. Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure, and Causal Interpretation in Historical Sociology,” American Journal of Sociology 98 (1993): 1099; Larry W. Isaac, “Transforming Localities: Reflections on Time, Causality, and Narrative in Contemporary Historical Sociology,” Historical Methods 30 (1997): 7; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology,” in Terrence J. McDonald, editor. The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 262-264; Margaret R. Somers, “We’re No Angels: Realism, Rational Choice, and Relationility in Social Science,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 768-769; Charles Tilly, “Future History,” Theory and Society 17/6 (1988): 710; Charles Tilly, “The Time of States,” Social Research 61 (1994): 270.
4. Ronald Aminzade, “Historical Sociology and Time,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 462-467; Larry J. Griffin, “Temporality, Events, and Explanation in Historical Sociology: An Introduction,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 413-414; Larry J. Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure, and Causal Interpretation in Historical Sociology,” American Journal of Sociology 98 (1993): 1099; Larry W. Isaac, “Transforming Localities: Reflections on Time, Causality, and Narrative in Contemporary Historical Sociology,” Historical Methods 30 (1997): 7; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology,” in Terrence J. McDonald, editor. The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 262-264; Margaret R. Somers, “We’re No Angels: Realism, Rational Choice, and Relationility in Social Science,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 768-769; Charles Tilly, “Future History,” Theory and Society 17/6 (1988): 710; Charles Tilly, “The Time of States,” Social Research 61 (1994): 270.
5. Ronald Aminzade, “Historical Sociology and Time,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 462-467; Larry J. Griffin, “Temporality, Events, and Explanation in Historical Sociology: An Introduction,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 413-414; Larry J. Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure, and Causal Interpretation in Historical Sociology,” American Journal of Sociology 98 (1993): 1099; Larry W. Isaac, “Transforming Localities: Reflections on Time, Causality, and Narrative in Contemporary Historical Sociology,” Historical Methods 30 (1997): 7; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology,” in Terrence J. McDonald, editor. The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 262-264; Margaret R. Somers, “We’re No Angels: Realism, Rational Choice, and Relationility in Social Science,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 768-769; Charles Tilly, “Future History,” Theory and Society 17/6 (1988): 710; Charles Tilly, “The Time of States,” Social Research 61 (1994): 270.
6. Ronald Aminzade, “Historical Sociology and Time,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 462-467; Larry J. Griffin, “Temporality, Events, and Explanation in Historical Sociology: An Introduction,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 413-414; Larry J. Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure, and Causal Interpretation in Historical Sociology,” American Journal of Sociology 98 (1993): 1099; Larry W. Isaac, “Transforming Localities: Reflections on Time, Causality, and Narrative in Contemporary Historical Sociology,” Historical Methods 30 (1997): 7; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology,” in Terrence J. McDonald, editor. The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 262-264; Margaret R. Somers, “We’re No Angels: Realism, Rational Choice, and Relationility in Social Science,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 768-769; Charles Tilly, “Future History,” Theory and Society 17/6 (1988): 710; Charles Tilly, “The Time of States,” Social Research 61 (1994): 270.
7. Ronald Aminzade, “Historical Sociology and Time,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 462-467; Larry J. Griffin, “Temporality, Events, and Explanation in Historical Sociology: An Introduction,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 413-414; Larry J. Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure, and Causal Interpretation in Historical Sociology,” American Journal of Sociology 98 (1993): 1099; Larry W. Isaac, “Transforming Localities: Reflections on Time, Causality, and Narrative in Contemporary Historical Sociology,” Historical Methods 30 (1997): 7; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology,” in Terrence J. McDonald, editor. The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 262-264; Margaret R. Somers, “We’re No Angels: Realism, Rational Choice, and Relationility in Social Science,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 768-769; Charles Tilly, “Future History,” Theory and Society 17/6 (1988): 710; Charles Tilly, “The Time of States,” Social Research 61 (1994): 270.
8. Ronald Aminzade, “Historical Sociology and Time,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 462-467; Larry J. Griffin, “Temporality, Events, and Explanation in Historical Sociology: An Introduction,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 413-414; Larry J. Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure, and Causal Interpretation in Historical Sociology,” American Journal of Sociology 98 (1993): 1099; Larry W. Isaac, “Transforming Localities: Reflections on Time, Causality, and Narrative in Contemporary Historical Sociology,” Historical Methods 30 (1997): 7; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology,” in Terrence J. McDonald, editor. The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 262-264; Margaret R. Somers, “We’re No Angels: Realism, Rational Choice, and Relationility in Social Science,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 768-769; Charles Tilly, “Future History,” Theory and Society 17/6 (1988): 710; Charles Tilly, “The Time of States,” Social Research 61 (1994): 270.
9. W. Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Paul A. David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,” American Economic Review 75 (1985): 332-337; Douglas C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
10. W. Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Paul A. David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,” American Economic Review 75 (1985): 332-337; Douglas C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
11. W. Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Paul A. David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,” American Economic Review 75 (1985): 332-337; Douglas C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
12. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, 100; Sheri Bernan, “Path Dependency and Political Action: Reexamining Responses to the Depression,” Comparative Politics 30 (1998): 379-400.
13. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, 100; Sheri Bernan, “Path Dependency and Political Action: Reexamining Responses to the Depression,” Comparative Politics 30 (1998): 379-400.
14. Path analysis has roots in the Simon-Blalock model of linear causal analysis. In a discussion of this model, Boudon identified a weak form of path analysis that he referred to as “dependence analysis." See Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), chapter 2; Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964); and Raymond Boudon, “A Method of Linear Causal Analysis,” American Sociological Review 30 (1965): 365-374.
15. Path analysis has roots in the Simon-Blalock model of linear causal analysis. In a discussion of this model, Boudon identified a weak form of path analysis that he referred to as “dependence analysis." See Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), chapter 2; Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964); and Raymond Boudon, “A Method of Linear Causal Analysis,” American Sociological Review 30 (1965): 365-374.
16. Path analysis has roots in the Simon-Blalock model of linear causal analysis. In a discussion of this model, Boudon identified a weak form of path analysis that he referred to as “dependence analysis." See Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), chapter 2; Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964); and Raymond Boudon, “A Method of Linear Causal Analysis,” American Sociological Review 30 (1965): 365-374.
17. See Jack A. Goldstone, “Initial Conditions, General Laws, Path Dependence, and Explanation in Historical Sociology,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 843.
18. Rebecca Emigh, “The Power of Negative Thinking: The Use of Negative Case Methodology in the Development of Sociological Theory,” Theory and Society 26 (1997): 649.
19. This argument is developed in Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics." American Political Science Review 94 (2000): 251-267. See also Arthur, Increasing Returns; Elhanan Helpman and Paul Krugman, Market Structure and Foreign Trade (Cambridge: MIT Press. 1985); Paul Krugman, “History and Industry Location: The Case of the Manufacturing Belt,” American Economic Review 81 (1991): 80-83: Paul M. Romer, “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986): 1002-1037.
20. This argument is developed in Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics." American Political Science Review 94 (2000): 251-267. See also Arthur, Increasing Returns; Elhanan Helpman and Paul Krugman, Market Structure and Foreign Trade (Cambridge: MIT Press. 1985); Paul Krugman, “History and Industry Location: The Case of the Manufacturing Belt,” American Economic Review 81 (1991): 80-83: Paul M. Romer, “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986): 1002-1037.
21. This argument is developed in Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics." American Political Science Review 94 (2000): 251-267. See also Arthur, Increasing Returns; Elhanan Helpman and Paul Krugman, Market Structure and Foreign Trade (Cambridge: MIT Press. 1985); Paul Krugman, “History and Industry Location: The Case of the Manufacturing Belt,” American Economic Review 81 (1991): 80-83: Paul M. Romer, “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986): 1002-1037.
22. This argument is developed in Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics." American Political Science Review 94 (2000): 251-267. See also Arthur, Increasing Returns; Elhanan Helpman and Paul Krugman, Market Structure and Foreign Trade (Cambridge: MIT Press. 1985); Paul Krugman, “History and Industry Location: The Case of the Manufacturing Belt,” American Economic Review 81 (1991): 80-83: Paul M. Romer, “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986): 1002-1037.
23. This argument is developed in Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics." American Political Science Review 94 (2000): 251-267. See also Arthur, Increasing Returns; Elhanan Helpman and Paul Krugman, Market Structure and Foreign Trade (Cambridge: MIT Press. 1985); Paul Krugman, “History and Industry Location: The Case of the Manufacturing Belt,” American Economic Review 81 (1991): 80-83: Paul M. Romer, “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986): 1002-1037.
24. On the importance of the mechanisms underpinning self-reinforcing sequences, see KathleenThelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics." Annual Review of Political Science 2(1999): 388-392.
25. See Andrew Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events: Concepts and Methods for the Analysis of Order in Social Processes,” Historical Methods 16 (1983): 129-147: Griffin. “Temporality, Events, and Explanation"; Sewell, “Three Temporalities.
26. See Andrew Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events: Concepts and Methods for the Analysis of Order in Social Processes,” Historical Methods 16 (1983): 129-147: Griffin. “Temporality, Events, and Explanation"; Sewell, “Three Temporalities.
27. See Andrew Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events: Concepts and Methods for the Analysis of Order in Social Processes,” Historical Methods 16 (1983): 129-147: Griffin. “Temporality, Events, and Explanation"; Sewell, “Three Temporalities.
28. See James Mahoney, “Strategies of Causal Inference in Small-N Analysis,” Sociological Methods and Research 28 (2000): 387-424.
29. Sewell, “Three Temporalities,” 262-263. For scholars who basically adopt this definition, see Barbara Geddes, “Paradigms and Sand Castles in Comparative Politics of Developing Areas,” in William Crotty. editor, Political Science: Looking to the Future, vol. 2. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press 1991), 59: Isaac. “Transforming Localities,” 7: Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 11; Jill Quadagno and Stan J. Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?: Thoughts on the History/Theory Relationship,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 481-507; Somers. “We’re No Angels,” 768-769; Tilly, “Future History,” 710.
30. Sewell, “Three Temporalities,” 262-263. For scholars who basically adopt this definition, see Barbara Geddes, “Paradigms and Sand Castles in Comparative Politics of Developing Areas,” in William Crotty. editor, Political Science: Looking to the Future, vol. 2. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press 1991), 59: Isaac. “Transforming Localities,” 7: Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 11; Jill Quadagno and Stan J. Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?: Thoughts on the History/Theory Relationship,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 481-507; Somers. “We’re No Angels,” 768-769; Tilly, “Future History,” 710.
31. Sewell, “Three Temporalities,” 262-263. For scholars who basically adopt this definition, see Barbara Geddes, “Paradigms and Sand Castles in Comparative Politics of Developing Areas,” in William Crotty. editor, Political Science: Looking to the Future, vol. 2. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press 1991), 59: Isaac. “Transforming Localities,” 7: Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 11; Jill Quadagno and Stan J. Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?: Thoughts on the History/Theory Relationship,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 481-507; Somers. “We’re No Angels,” 768-769; Tilly, “Future History,” 710.
32. Sewell, “Three Temporalities,” 262-263. For scholars who basically adopt this definition, see Barbara Geddes, “Paradigms and Sand Castles in Comparative Politics of Developing Areas,” in William Crotty. editor, Political Science: Looking to the Future, vol. 2. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press 1991), 59: Isaac. “Transforming Localities,” 7: Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 11; Jill Quadagno and Stan J. Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?: Thoughts on the History/Theory Relationship,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 481-507; Somers. “We’re No Angels,” 768-769; Tilly, “Future History,” 710.
33. Sewell, “Three Temporalities,” 262-263. For scholars who basically adopt this definition, see Barbara Geddes, “Paradigms and Sand Castles in Comparative Politics of Developing Areas,” in William Crotty. editor, Political Science: Looking to the Future, vol. 2. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press 1991), 59: Isaac. “Transforming Localities,” 7: Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 11; Jill Quadagno and Stan J. Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?: Thoughts on the History/Theory Relationship,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 481-507; Somers. “We’re No Angels,” 768-769; Tilly, “Future History,” 710.
34. Sewell, “Three Temporalities,” 262-263. For scholars who basically adopt this definition, see Barbara Geddes, “Paradigms and Sand Castles in Comparative Politics of Developing Areas,” in William Crotty. editor, Political Science: Looking to the Future, vol. 2. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press 1991), 59: Isaac. “Transforming Localities,” 7: Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 11; Jill Quadagno and Stan J. Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?: Thoughts on the History/Theory Relationship,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 481-507; Somers. “We’re No Angels,” 768-769; Tilly, “Future History,” 710.
35. Sewell, “Three Temporalities,” 262-263. For scholars who basically adopt this definition, see Barbara Geddes, “Paradigms and Sand Castles in Comparative Politics of Developing Areas,” in William Crotty. editor, Political Science: Looking to the Future, vol. 2. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press 1991), 59: Isaac. “Transforming Localities,” 7: Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 11; Jill Quadagno and Stan J. Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?: Thoughts on the History/Theory Relationship,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 481-507; Somers. “We’re No Angels,” 768-769; Tilly, “Future History,” 710.
36. Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, 11.
37. Bart Nooteboom, “Path Dependence of Knowledge: Implications for the Theory of the Firm,” in Lars Magnusson and Jan Ottosson, editors, Evolutionary Economics and Path Dependence (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1997), 57.
38. Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events"; Andrew Abbott. “Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods: Causal and Narrative Approaches,” Historical Methods 23 (1990): 140-150: Andrew Abbott. “From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative Positivism,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 428-455; Griffin. “Temporality, Events, and Explanation": Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure": Jeffrey Haydu. “Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of Problem Solving,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 339-371; Issac. “Transforming Localities"; Larry W. Isaac and Larry J. Griffin, “Ahistoricism in Time-Series Analysis of Historical Process: Critique, Redirection, and Illustrations from U.S. Labor History,” American Sociological Review 54 (1989): 873-890; Paul Pierson. “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” Studies in American Political Development 14 (2000):73 93: Quadagno and Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?": Sewell, “Three Temporalities"; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille,” Theory and Society 25/6 (1996): 841-881; Charles Tilly. As Sociology Meets History (New York: Academic Press, 1981): Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes. Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984); Tilly, “Future History.
39. Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events"; Andrew Abbott. “Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods: Causal and Narrative Approaches,” Historical Methods 23 (1990): 140-150: Andrew Abbott. “From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative Positivism,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 428-455; Griffin. “Temporality, Events, and Explanation": Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure": Jeffrey Haydu. “Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of Problem Solving,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 339-371; Issac. “Transforming Localities"; Larry W. Isaac and Larry J. Griffin, “Ahistoricism in Time-Series Analysis of Historical Process: Critique, Redirection, and Illustrations from U.S. Labor History,” American Sociological Review 54 (1989): 873-890; Paul Pierson. “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” Studies in American Political Development 14 (2000):73 93: Quadagno and Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?": Sewell, “Three Temporalities"; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille,” Theory and Society 25/6 (1996): 841-881; Charles Tilly. As Sociology Meets History (New York: Academic Press, 1981): Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes. Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984); Tilly, “Future History.
40. Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events"; Andrew Abbott. “Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods: Causal and Narrative Approaches,” Historical Methods 23 (1990): 140-150: Andrew Abbott. “From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative Positivism,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 428-455; Griffin. “Temporality, Events, and Explanation": Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure": Jeffrey Haydu. “Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of Problem Solving,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 339-371; Issac. “Transforming Localities"; Larry W. Isaac and Larry J. Griffin, “Ahistoricism in Time-Series Analysis of Historical Process: Critique, Redirection, and Illustrations from U.S. Labor History,” American Sociological Review 54 (1989): 873-890; Paul Pierson. “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” Studies in American Political Development 14 (2000):73 93: Quadagno and Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?": Sewell, “Three Temporalities"; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille,” Theory and Society 25/6 (1996): 841-881; Charles Tilly. As Sociology Meets History (New York: Academic Press, 1981): Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes. Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984); Tilly, “Future History.
41. Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events"; Andrew Abbott. “Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods: Causal and Narrative Approaches,” Historical Methods 23 (1990): 140-150: Andrew Abbott. “From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative Positivism,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 428-455; Griffin. “Temporality, Events, and Explanation": Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure": Jeffrey Haydu. “Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of Problem Solving,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 339-371; Issac. “Transforming Localities"; Larry W. Isaac and Larry J. Griffin, “Ahistoricism in Time-Series Analysis of Historical Process: Critique, Redirection, and Illustrations from U.S. Labor History,” American Sociological Review 54 (1989): 873-890; Paul Pierson. “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” Studies in American Political Development 14 (2000):73 93: Quadagno and Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?": Sewell, “Three Temporalities"; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille,” Theory and Society 25/6 (1996): 841-881; Charles Tilly. As Sociology Meets History (New York: Academic Press, 1981): Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes. Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984); Tilly, “Future History.
42. Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events"; Andrew Abbott. “Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods: Causal and Narrative Approaches,” Historical Methods 23 (1990): 140-150: Andrew Abbott. “From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative Positivism,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 428-455; Griffin. “Temporality, Events, and Explanation": Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure": Jeffrey Haydu. “Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of Problem Solving,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 339-371; Issac. “Transforming Localities"; Larry W. Isaac and Larry J. Griffin, “Ahistoricism in Time-Series Analysis of Historical Process: Critique, Redirection, and Illustrations from U.S. Labor History,” American Sociological Review 54 (1989): 873-890; Paul Pierson. “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” Studies in American Political Development 14 (2000):73 93: Quadagno and Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?": Sewell, “Three Temporalities"; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille,” Theory and Society 25/6 (1996): 841-881; Charles Tilly. As Sociology Meets History (New York: Academic Press, 1981): Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes. Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984); Tilly, “Future History.
43. Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events"; Andrew Abbott. “Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods: Causal and Narrative Approaches,” Historical Methods 23 (1990): 140-150: Andrew Abbott. “From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative Positivism,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 428-455; Griffin. “Temporality, Events, and Explanation": Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure": Jeffrey Haydu. “Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of Problem Solving,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 339-371; Issac. “Transforming Localities"; Larry W. Isaac and Larry J. Griffin, “Ahistoricism in Time-Series Analysis of Historical Process: Critique, Redirection, and Illustrations from U.S. Labor History,” American Sociological Review 54 (1989): 873-890; Paul Pierson. “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” Studies in American Political Development 14 (2000):73 93: Quadagno and Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?": Sewell, “Three Temporalities"; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille,” Theory and Society 25/6 (1996): 841-881; Charles Tilly. As Sociology Meets History (New York: Academic Press, 1981): Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes. Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984); Tilly, “Future History.
44. Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events"; Andrew Abbott. “Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods: Causal and Narrative Approaches,” Historical Methods 23 (1990): 140-150: Andrew Abbott. “From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative Positivism,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 428-455; Griffin. “Temporality, Events, and Explanation": Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure": Jeffrey Haydu. “Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of Problem Solving,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 339-371; Issac. “Transforming Localities"; Larry W. Isaac and Larry J. Griffin, “Ahistoricism in Time-Series Analysis of Historical Process: Critique, Redirection, and Illustrations from U.S. Labor History,” American Sociological Review 54 (1989): 873-890; Paul Pierson. “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” Studies in American Political Development 14 (2000):73 93: Quadagno and Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?": Sewell, “Three Temporalities"; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille,” Theory and Society 25/6 (1996): 841-881; Charles Tilly. As Sociology Meets History (New York: Academic Press, 1981): Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes. Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984); Tilly, “Future History.
45. Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events"; Andrew Abbott. “Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods: Causal and Narrative Approaches,” Historical Methods 23 (1990): 140-150: Andrew Abbott. “From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative Positivism,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 428-455; Griffin. “Temporality, Events, and Explanation": Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure": Jeffrey Haydu. “Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of Problem Solving,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 339-371; Issac. “Transforming Localities"; Larry W. Isaac and Larry J. Griffin, “Ahistoricism in Time-Series Analysis of Historical Process: Critique, Redirection, and Illustrations from U.S. Labor History,” American Sociological Review 54 (1989): 873-890; Paul Pierson. “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” Studies in American Political Development 14 (2000):73 93: Quadagno and Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?": Sewell, “Three Temporalities"; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille,” Theory and Society 25/6 (1996): 841-881; Charles Tilly. As Sociology Meets History (New York: Academic Press, 1981): Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes. Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984); Tilly, “Future History.
46. Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events"; Andrew Abbott. “Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods: Causal and Narrative Approaches,” Historical Methods 23 (1990): 140-150: Andrew Abbott. “From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative Positivism,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 428-455; Griffin. “Temporality, Events, and Explanation": Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure": Jeffrey Haydu. “Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of Problem Solving,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 339-371; Issac. “Transforming Localities"; Larry W. Isaac and Larry J. Griffin, “Ahistoricism in Time-Series Analysis of Historical Process: Critique, Redirection, and Illustrations from U.S. Labor History,” American Sociological Review 54 (1989): 873-890; Paul Pierson. “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” Studies in American Political Development 14 (2000):73 93: Quadagno and Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?": Sewell, “Three Temporalities"; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille,” Theory and Society 25/6 (1996): 841-881; Charles Tilly. As Sociology Meets History (New York: Academic Press, 1981): Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes. Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984); Tilly, “Future History.
47. Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events"; Andrew Abbott. “Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods: Causal and Narrative Approaches,” Historical Methods 23 (1990): 140-150: Andrew Abbott. “From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative Positivism,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 428-455; Griffin. “Temporality, Events, and Explanation": Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure": Jeffrey Haydu. “Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of Problem Solving,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 339-371; Issac. “Transforming Localities"; Larry W. Isaac and Larry J. Griffin, “Ahistoricism in Time-Series Analysis of Historical Process: Critique, Redirection, and Illustrations from U.S. Labor History,” American Sociological Review 54 (1989): 873-890; Paul Pierson. “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” Studies in American Political Development 14 (2000):73 93: Quadagno and Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?": Sewell, “Three Temporalities"; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille,” Theory and Society 25/6 (1996): 841-881; Charles Tilly. As Sociology Meets History (New York: Academic Press, 1981): Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes. Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984); Tilly, “Future History.
48. Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events"; Andrew Abbott. “Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods: Causal and Narrative Approaches,” Historical Methods 23 (1990): 140-150: Andrew Abbott. “From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative Positivism,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 428-455; Griffin. “Temporality, Events, and Explanation": Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure": Jeffrey Haydu. “Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of Problem Solving,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 339-371; Issac. “Transforming Localities"; Larry W. Isaac and Larry J. Griffin, “Ahistoricism in Time-Series Analysis of Historical Process: Critique, Redirection, and Illustrations from U.S. Labor History,” American Sociological Review 54 (1989): 873-890; Paul Pierson. “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” Studies in American Political Development 14 (2000):73 93: Quadagno and Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?": Sewell, “Three Temporalities"; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille,” Theory and Society 25/6 (1996): 841-881; Charles Tilly. As Sociology Meets History (New York: Academic Press, 1981): Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes. Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984); Tilly, “Future History.
49. Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events"; Andrew Abbott. “Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods: Causal and Narrative Approaches,” Historical Methods 23 (1990): 140-150: Andrew Abbott. “From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative Positivism,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 428-455; Griffin. “Temporality, Events, and Explanation": Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure": Jeffrey Haydu. “Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of Problem Solving,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 339-371; Issac. “Transforming Localities"; Larry W. Isaac and Larry J. Griffin, “Ahistoricism in Time-Series Analysis of Historical Process: Critique, Redirection, and Illustrations from U.S. Labor History,” American Sociological Review 54 (1989): 873-890; Paul Pierson. “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” Studies in American Political Development 14 (2000):73 93: Quadagno and Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?": Sewell, “Three Temporalities"; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille,” Theory and Society 25/6 (1996): 841-881; Charles Tilly. As Sociology Meets History (New York: Academic Press, 1981): Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes. Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984); Tilly, “Future History.
50. Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events"; Andrew Abbott. “Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods: Causal and Narrative Approaches,” Historical Methods 23 (1990): 140-150: Andrew Abbott. “From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative Positivism,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 428-455; Griffin. “Temporality, Events, and Explanation": Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure": Jeffrey Haydu. “Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of Problem Solving,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 339-371; Issac. “Transforming Localities"; Larry W. Isaac and Larry J. Griffin, “Ahistoricism in Time-Series Analysis of Historical Process: Critique, Redirection, and Illustrations from U.S. Labor History,” American Sociological Review 54 (1989): 873-890; Paul Pierson. “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” Studies in American Political Development 14 (2000):73 93: Quadagno and Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?": Sewell, “Three Temporalities"; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille,” Theory and Society 25/6 (1996): 841-881; Charles Tilly. As Sociology Meets History (New York: Academic Press, 1981): Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes. Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984); Tilly, “Future History.
51. Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events"; Andrew Abbott. “Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods: Causal and Narrative Approaches,” Historical Methods 23 (1990): 140-150: Andrew Abbott. “From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative Positivism,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 428-455; Griffin. “Temporality, Events, and Explanation": Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure": Jeffrey Haydu. “Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of Problem Solving,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 339-371; Issac. “Transforming Localities"; Larry W. Isaac and Larry J. Griffin, “Ahistoricism in Time-Series Analysis of Historical Process: Critique, Redirection, and Illustrations from U.S. Labor History,” American Sociological Review 54 (1989): 873-890; Paul Pierson. “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” Studies in American Political Development 14 (2000):73 93: Quadagno and Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?": Sewell, “Three Temporalities"; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille,” Theory and Society 25/6 (1996): 841-881; Charles Tilly. As Sociology Meets History (New York: Academic Press, 1981): Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes. Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984); Tilly, “Future History.
52. Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events"; Andrew Abbott. “Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods: Causal and Narrative Approaches,” Historical Methods 23 (1990): 140-150: Andrew Abbott. “From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative Positivism,” Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 428-455; Griffin. “Temporality, Events, and Explanation": Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure": Jeffrey Haydu. “Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of Problem Solving,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 339-371; Issac. “Transforming Localities"; Larry W. Isaac and Larry J. Griffin, “Ahistoricism in Time-Series Analysis of Historical Process: Critique, Redirection, and Illustrations from U.S. Labor History,” American Sociological Review 54 (1989): 873-890; Paul Pierson. “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” Studies in American Political Development 14 (2000):73 93: Quadagno and Knapp. “Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory?": Sewell, “Three Temporalities"; William H. Sewell, Jr., “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille,” Theory and Society 25/6 (1996): 841-881; Charles Tilly. As Sociology Meets History (New York: Academic Press, 1981): Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes. Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984); Tilly, “Future History.
53. For illustrations of this idea, see Thomas C. Schelling. Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 15; James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York: Penguin, 1987), 8.
54. For illustrations of this idea, see Thomas C. Schelling. Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 15; James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York: Penguin, 1987), 8.
55. Pierson, “Increasing Returns,” 263.
56. Arthur, Increasing Returns, 6-7.
57. Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events,” 129; Tilly, Big Structures, 14, his emphasis.
58. Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events,” 129; Tilly, Big Structures, 14, his emphasis.
59. Arthur, Increasing Returns, 17; Haydu, “Making Use of the Past,” 352; Goldstone, “Initial Conditions,” 834-835.
60. Arthur, Increasing Returns, 17; Haydu, “Making Use of the Past,” 352; Goldstone, “Initial Conditions,” 834-835.
61. Arthur, Increasing Returns, 17; Haydu, “Making Use of the Past,” 352; Goldstone, “Initial Conditions,” 834-835.
62. Goldstone, “Initial Conditions,” 834.
63. Abbott, “From Causes to Events,” 445.
64. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
65. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
66. Pierson, “Increasing Returns"; Arthur, Increasing Returns; David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY.
67. Pierson, “Increasing Returns"; Arthur, Increasing Returns; David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY.
68. Pierson, “Increasing Returns"; Arthur, Increasing Returns; David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY.
69. Arthur, Increasing Returns: David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY"; Paul A. David and Julie Bunn, “The Economics of Gateway Technologies and Network Evolution: Lessons from Electricity Supply History,” Information Economics and Policy 3 (1988): 165-202: Robin Cowan, “Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-In,” Journal of Economic History 50 (1990): 541-567; Robin Cowan and Philip Gunby, “Sprayed to Death: Path Dependence, Lock-In and Pest Control Strategies,” Economic Journal 106 (1996): 521-542; Eban Goodstein, “The Economic Roots of Environmental Decline: Property Rights or Path Dependence,” Journal of Economic Issues 29 (1995): 1029-1043; John Hartwick, “The Persistence of QWERTY and Analogous Suboptimal Standards,” unpublished manuscript. Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s University, 1985. The empirical accuracy of some of these examples has been contested by Liebowitz and Margolis. These authors present a broad theoretical critique of path dependence that suggests inefficient outcomes occur rarely or never in the marketplace. See S. J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, “Path-Dependence, Lock-In, and History,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11 (1995): 205-226. However, as Pierson ("Increasing Returns,” 15) argues, this critique is less relevant to non-market social settings. See also Oliver E. Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics and Organizational Theory,” Industrial and Corporate Change 1 (1993): 107-156.
70. Arthur, Increasing Returns: David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY"; Paul A. David and Julie Bunn, “The Economics of Gateway Technologies and Network Evolution: Lessons from Electricity Supply History,” Information Economics and Policy 3 (1988): 165-202: Robin Cowan, “Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-In,” Journal of Economic History 50 (1990): 541-567; Robin Cowan and Philip Gunby, “Sprayed to Death: Path Dependence, Lock-In and Pest Control Strategies,” Economic Journal 106 (1996): 521-542; Eban Goodstein, “The Economic Roots of Environmental Decline: Property Rights or Path Dependence,” Journal of Economic Issues 29 (1995): 1029-1043; John Hartwick, “The Persistence of QWERTY and Analogous Suboptimal Standards,” unpublished manuscript. Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s University, 1985. The empirical accuracy of some of these examples has been contested by Liebowitz and Margolis. These authors present a broad theoretical critique of path dependence that suggests inefficient outcomes occur rarely or never in the marketplace. See S. J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, “Path-Dependence, Lock-In, and History,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11 (1995): 205-226. However, as Pierson ("Increasing Returns,” 15) argues, this critique is less relevant to non-market social settings. See also Oliver E. Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics and Organizational Theory,” Industrial and Corporate Change 1 (1993): 107-156.
71. Arthur, Increasing Returns: David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY"; Paul A. David and Julie Bunn, “The Economics of Gateway Technologies and Network Evolution: Lessons from Electricity Supply History,” Information Economics and Policy 3 (1988): 165-202: Robin Cowan, “Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-In,” Journal of Economic History 50 (1990): 541-567; Robin Cowan and Philip Gunby, “Sprayed to Death: Path Dependence, Lock-In and Pest Control Strategies,” Economic Journal 106 (1996): 521-542; Eban Goodstein, “The Economic Roots of Environmental Decline: Property Rights or Path Dependence,” Journal of Economic Issues 29 (1995): 1029-1043; John Hartwick, “The Persistence of QWERTY and Analogous Suboptimal Standards,” unpublished manuscript. Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s University, 1985. The empirical accuracy of some of these examples has been contested by Liebowitz and Margolis. These authors present a broad theoretical critique of path dependence that suggests inefficient outcomes occur rarely or never in the marketplace. See S. J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, “Path-Dependence, Lock-In, and History,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11 (1995): 205-226. However, as Pierson ("Increasing Returns,” 15) argues, this critique is less relevant to non-market social settings. See also Oliver E. Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics and Organizational Theory,” Industrial and Corporate Change 1 (1993): 107-156.
72. Arthur, Increasing Returns: David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY"; Paul A. David and Julie Bunn, “The Economics of Gateway Technologies and Network Evolution: Lessons from Electricity Supply History,” Information Economics and Policy 3 (1988): 165-202: Robin Cowan, “Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-In,” Journal of Economic History 50 (1990): 541-567; Robin Cowan and Philip Gunby, “Sprayed to Death: Path Dependence, Lock-In and Pest Control Strategies,” Economic Journal 106 (1996): 521-542; Eban Goodstein, “The Economic Roots of Environmental Decline: Property Rights or Path Dependence,” Journal of Economic Issues 29 (1995): 1029-1043; John Hartwick, “The Persistence of QWERTY and Analogous Suboptimal Standards,” unpublished manuscript. Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s University, 1985. The empirical accuracy of some of these examples has been contested by Liebowitz and Margolis. These authors present a broad theoretical critique of path dependence that suggests inefficient outcomes occur rarely or never in the marketplace. See S. J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, “Path-Dependence, Lock-In, and History,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11 (1995): 205-226. However, as Pierson ("Increasing Returns,” 15) argues, this critique is less relevant to non-market social settings. See also Oliver E. Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics and Organizational Theory,” Industrial and Corporate Change 1 (1993): 107-156.
73. Arthur, Increasing Returns: David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY"; Paul A. David and Julie Bunn, “The Economics of Gateway Technologies and Network Evolution: Lessons from Electricity Supply History,” Information Economics and Policy 3 (1988): 165-202: Robin Cowan, “Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-In,” Journal of Economic History 50 (1990): 541-567; Robin Cowan and Philip Gunby, “Sprayed to Death: Path Dependence, Lock-In and Pest Control Strategies,” Economic Journal 106 (1996): 521-542; Eban Goodstein, “The Economic Roots of Environmental Decline: Property Rights or Path Dependence,” Journal of Economic Issues 29 (1995): 1029-1043; John Hartwick, “The Persistence of QWERTY and Analogous Suboptimal Standards,” unpublished manuscript. Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s University, 1985. The empirical accuracy of some of these examples has been contested by Liebowitz and Margolis. These authors present a broad theoretical critique of path dependence that suggests inefficient outcomes occur rarely or never in the marketplace. See S. J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, “Path-Dependence, Lock-In, and History,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11 (1995): 205-226. However, as Pierson ("Increasing Returns,” 15) argues, this critique is less relevant to non-market social settings. See also Oliver E. Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics and Organizational Theory,” Industrial and Corporate Change 1 (1993): 107-156.
74. Arthur, Increasing Returns: David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY"; Paul A. David and Julie Bunn, “The Economics of Gateway Technologies and Network Evolution: Lessons from Electricity Supply History,” Information Economics and Policy 3 (1988): 165-202: Robin Cowan, “Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-In,” Journal of Economic History 50 (1990): 541-567; Robin Cowan and Philip Gunby, “Sprayed to Death: Path Dependence, Lock-In and Pest Control Strategies,” Economic Journal 106 (1996): 521-542; Eban Goodstein, “The Economic Roots of Environmental Decline: Property Rights or Path Dependence,” Journal of Economic Issues 29 (1995): 1029-1043; John Hartwick, “The Persistence of QWERTY and Analogous Suboptimal Standards,” unpublished manuscript. Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s University, 1985. The empirical accuracy of some of these examples has been contested by Liebowitz and Margolis. These authors present a broad theoretical critique of path dependence that suggests inefficient outcomes occur rarely or never in the marketplace. See S. J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, “Path-Dependence, Lock-In, and History,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11 (1995): 205-226. However, as Pierson ("Increasing Returns,” 15) argues, this critique is less relevant to non-market social settings. See also Oliver E. Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics and Organizational Theory,” Industrial and Corporate Change 1 (1993): 107-156.
75. Arthur, Increasing Returns: David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY"; Paul A. David and Julie Bunn, “The Economics of Gateway Technologies and Network Evolution: Lessons from Electricity Supply History,” Information Economics and Policy 3 (1988): 165-202: Robin Cowan, “Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-In,” Journal of Economic History 50 (1990): 541-567; Robin Cowan and Philip Gunby, “Sprayed to Death: Path Dependence, Lock-In and Pest Control Strategies,” Economic Journal 106 (1996): 521-542; Eban Goodstein, “The Economic Roots of Environmental Decline: Property Rights or Path Dependence,” Journal of Economic Issues 29 (1995): 1029-1043; John Hartwick, “The Persistence of QWERTY and Analogous Suboptimal Standards,” unpublished manuscript. Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s University, 1985. The empirical accuracy of some of these examples has been contested by Liebowitz and Margolis. These authors present a broad theoretical critique of path dependence that suggests inefficient outcomes occur rarely or never in the marketplace. See S. J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, “Path-Dependence, Lock-In, and History,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11 (1995): 205-226. However, as Pierson ("Increasing Returns,” 15) argues, this critique is less relevant to non-market social settings. See also Oliver E. Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics and Organizational Theory,” Industrial and Corporate Change 1 (1993): 107-156.
76. Arthur, Increasing Returns: David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY"; Paul A. David and Julie Bunn, “The Economics of Gateway Technologies and Network Evolution: Lessons from Electricity Supply
77. Arthur, Increasing Returns: David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY"; Paul A. David and Julie Bunn, “The Economics of Gateway Technologies and Network Evolution: Lessons from Electricity Supply History,” Information Economics and Policy 3 (1988): 165-202: Robin Cowan, “Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-In,” Journal of Economic History 50 (1990): 541-567; Robin Cowan and Philip Gunby, “Sprayed to Death: Path Dependence, Lock-In and Pest Control Strategies,” Economic Journal 106 (1996): 521-542; Eban Goodstein, “The Economic Roots of Environmental Decline: Property Rights or Path Dependence,” Journal of Economic Issues 29 (1995): 1029-1043; John Hartwick, “The Persistence of QWERTY and Analogous Suboptimal Standards,” unpublished manuscript. Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s University, 1985. The empirical accuracy of some of these examples has been contested by Liebowitz and Margolis. These authors present a broad theoretical critique of path dependence that suggests inefficient outcomes occur rarely or never in the marketplace. See S. J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, “Path-Dependence, Lock-In, and History,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11 (1995): 205-226. However, as Pierson ("Increasing Returns,” 15) argues, this critique is less relevant to non-market social settings. See also Oliver E. Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics and Organizational Theory,” Industrial and Corporate Change 1 (1993): 107-156.
78. Arthur, Increasing Returns: David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY"; Paul A. David and Julie Bunn, “The Economics of Gateway Technologies and Network Evolution: Lessons from Electricity Supply History,” Information Economics and Policy 3 (1988): 165-202: Robin Cowan, “Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-In,” Journal of Economic History 50 (1990): 541-567; Robin Cowan and Philip Gunby, “Sprayed to Death: Path Dependence, Lock-In and Pest Control Strategies,” Economic Journal 106 (1996): 521-542; Eban Goodstein, “The Economic Roots of Environmental Decline: Property Rights or Path Dependence,” Journal of Economic Issues 29 (1995): 1029-1043; John Hartwick, “The Persistence of QWERTY and Analogous Suboptimal Standards,” unpublished manuscript. Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s University, 1985. The empirical accuracy of some of these examples has been contested by Liebowitz and Margolis. These authors present a broad theoretical critique of path dependence that suggests inefficient outcomes occur rarely or never in the marketplace. See S. J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, “Path-Dependence, Lock-In, and History,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11 (1995): 205-226. However, as Pierson ("Increasing Returns,” 15) argues, this critique is less relevant to non-market social settings. See also Oliver E. Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics and Organizational Theory,” Industrial and Corporate Change 1 (1993): 107-156.
79. Haydu, “Making Use of the Past"; Stephen D. Krasner, “Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective,” Comparative Political Studies 21 (1988): 66-94; North, Institutions, Institutional Change; Pierson,”Increasing Returns"; Walter W. Powell, “Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis,” in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Mark J. Roe. “Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics,” Harvard Law Review 109 (1996): 641-668; Anthony Woodlief, “The Path-Dependent City,” Urban Affairs Journal 33 (1998): 405-438.
80. Haydu, “Making Use of the Past"; Stephen D. Krasner, “Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective,” Comparative Political Studies 21 (1988): 66-94; North, Institutions, Institutional Change; Pierson,”Increasing Returns"; Walter W. Powell, “Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis,” in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Mark J. Roe. “Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics,” Harvard Law Review 109 (1996): 641-668; Anthony Woodlief, “The Path-Dependent City,” Urban Affairs Journal 33 (1998): 405-438.
81. Haydu, “Making Use of the Past"; Stephen D. Krasner, “Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective,” Comparative Political Studies 21 (1988): 66-94; North, Institutions, Institutional Change; Pierson,”Increasing Returns"; Walter W. Powell, “Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis,” in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Mark J. Roe. “Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics,” Harvard Law Review 109 (1996): 641-668; Anthony Woodlief, “The Path-Dependent City,” Urban Affairs Journal 33 (1998): 405-438.
82. Haydu, “Making Use of the Past"; Stephen D. Krasner, “Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective,” Comparative Political Studies 21 (1988): 66-94; North, Institutions, Institutional Change; Pierson,”Increasing Returns"; Walter W. Powell, “Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis,” in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Mark J. Roe. “Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics,” Harvard Law Review 109 (1996): 641-668; Anthony Woodlief, “The Path-Dependent City,” Urban Affairs Journal 33 (1998): 405-438.
83. Haydu, “Making Use of the Past"; Stephen D. Krasner, “Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective,” Comparative Political Studies 21 (1988): 66-94; North, Institutions, Institutional Change; Pierson,”Increasing Returns"; Walter W. Powell, “Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis,” in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Mark J. Roe. “Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics,” Harvard Law Review 109 (1996): 641-668; Anthony Woodlief, “The Path-Dependent City,” Urban Affairs Journal 33 (1998): 405-438.
84. Haydu, “Making Use of the Past"; Stephen D. Krasner, “Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective,” Comparative Political Studies 21 (1988): 66-94; North, Institutions, Institutional Change; Pierson,”Increasing Returns"; Walter W. Powell, “Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis,” in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Mark J. Roe. “Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics,” Harvard Law Review 109 (1996): 641-668; Anthony Woodlief, “The Path-Dependent City,” Urban Affairs Journal 33 (1998): 405-438.
85. Haydu, “Making Use of the Past"; Stephen D. Krasner, “Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective,” Comparative Political Studies 21 (1988): 66-94; North, Institutions, Institutional Change; Pierson,”Increasing Returns"; Walter W. Powell, “Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis,” in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Mark J. Roe. “Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics,” Harvard Law Review 109 (1996): 641-668; Anthony Woodlief, “The Path-Dependent City,” Urban Affairs Journal 33 (1998): 405-438.
86. Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies 44 (1996): 936-957; Krasner, “Sovereignty"; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” American Political Science Review 78 (1984): 734-749; John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,” American Journal of Sociology 83 (1977): 340-363; W. Richard Scott, “The Adolescence of Institutional Theory,” Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 493 511; Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
87. Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies 44 (1996): 936-957; Krasner, “Sovereignty"; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” American Political Science Review 78 (1984): 734-749; John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,” American Journal of Sociology 83 (1977): 340-363; W. Richard Scott, “The Adolescence of Institutional Theory,” Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 493 511; Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
88. Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies 44 (1996): 936-957; Krasner, “Sovereignty"; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” American Political Science Review 78 (1984): 734-749; John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,” American Journal of Sociology 83 (1977): 340-363; W. Richard Scott, “The Adolescence of Institutional Theory,” Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 493 511; Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
89. Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies 44 (1996): 936-957; Krasner, “Sovereignty"; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” American Political Science Review 78 (1984): 734-749; John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,” American Journal of Sociology 83 (1977): 340-363; W. Richard Scott, “The Adolescence of Institutional Theory,” Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 493 511; Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
90. Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies 44 (1996): 936-957; Krasner, “Sovereignty"; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” American Political Science Review 78 (1984): 734-749; John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,” American Journal of Sociology 83 (1977): 340-363; W. Richard Scott, “The Adolescence of Institutional Theory,” Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 493 511; Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
91. Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies 44 (1996): 936-957; Krasner, “Sovereignty"; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” American Political Science Review 78 (1984): 734-749; John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,” American Journal of Sociology 83 (1977): 340-363; W. Richard Scott, “The Adolescence of Institutional Theory,” Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 493 511; Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
92. Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies 44 (1996): 936-957; Krasner, “Sovereignty"; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” American Political Science Review 78 (1984): 734-749; John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,” American Journal of Sociology 83 (1977): 340-363; W. Richard Scott, “The Adolescence of Institutional Theory,” Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 493 511; Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
93. Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies 44 (1996): 936-957; Krasner, “Sovereignty"; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” American Political Science Review 78 (1984): 734-749; John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,” American Journal of Sociology 83 (1977): 340-363; W. Richard Scott, “The Adolescence of Institutional Theory,” Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 493 511; Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
94. Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies 44 (1996): 936-957; Krasner, “Sovereignty"; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” American Political Science Review 78 (1984): 734-749; John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,” American Journal of Sociology 83 (1977): 340-363; W. Richard Scott, “The Adolescence of Institutional Theory,” Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 493 511; Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
95. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories, 103. See also Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979), 25-26.
96. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories, 103. See also Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979), 25-26.
97. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: Free Press, 1967); Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Andrew Abbott, “On the Concept of Turning Point,” Comparative Social Research 16 (1997): 85-105.
98. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: Free Press, 1967); Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Andrew Abbott, “On the Concept of Turning Point,” Comparative Social Research 16 (1997): 85-105.
99. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: Free Press, 1967); Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Andrew Abbott, “On the Concept of Turning Point,” Comparative Social Research 16 (1997): 85-105.
100. Margaret Levi, “A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis,” in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, editors, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 28.
101. James D. Fearon, “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science,” World Politics 43 (1991): 577-592; James D. Fearon, “Causes and Counterfactuals in Social Science: Exploring an Analogy Between Cellular Automata and Historical Processes,” in Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, editors, Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
102. James D. Fearon, “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science,” World Politics 43 (1991): 577-592; James D. Fearon, “Causes and Counterfactuals in Social Science: Exploring an Analogy Between Cellular Automata and Historical Processes,” in Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, editors, Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
103. There are other understandings of “contingency" available in the literature. See, for example, Larry Griffin and Charles C. Ragin, “Some Observations on Formal Methods of Qualitative Analysis,” Sociological Methods and Research 23 (1994): 16; Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter, “The Role of General Theory in Comparative-Historical Sociology,” American Journal of Sociology 97 (1991): 6; and Quadagno and Knapp, “Have Sociologists Forsaken Theory?" 499-500.
104. There are other understandings of “contingency" available in the literature. See, for example, Larry Griffin and Charles C. Ragin, “Some Observations on Formal Methods of Qualitative Analysis,” Sociological Methods and Research 23 (1994): 16; Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter, “The Role of General Theory in Comparative-Historical Sociology,” American Journal of Sociology 97 (1991): 6; and Quadagno and Knapp, “Have Sociologists Forsaken Theory?" 499-500.
105. There are other understandings of “contingency" available in the literature. See, for example, Larry Griffin and Charles C. Ragin, “Some Observations on Formal Methods of Qualitative Analysis,” Sociological Methods and Research 23 (1994): 16; Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter, “The Role of General Theory in Comparative-Historical Sociology,” American Journal of Sociology 97 (1991): 6; and Quadagno and Knapp, “Have Sociologists Forsaken Theory?" 499-500.
106. See Jerome G. Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer, “Chance in Human Affairs,” Sociological Theory 12 (1994): 45-56; Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 59-60; Isaiah Berlin, Historical Inevitability (London: Oxford University Press, 1954); Lorenz Kruger, Lorraine J. Daston, and Michael Heidelberger, The Probabilistic Revolution: Ideas in History (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987).
107. See Jerome G. Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer, “Chance in Human Affairs,” Sociological Theory 12 (1994): 45-56; Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 59-60; Isaiah Berlin, Historical Inevitability (London: Oxford University Press, 1954); Lorenz Kruger, Lorraine J. Daston, and Michael Heidelberger, The Probabilistic Revolution: Ideas in History (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987).
108. See Jerome G. Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer, “Chance in Human Affairs,” Sociological Theory 12 (1994): 45-56; Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 59-60; Isaiah Berlin, Historical Inevitability (London: Oxford University Press, 1954); Lorenz Kruger, Lorraine J. Daston, and Michael Heidelberger, The Probabilistic Revolution: Ideas in History (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987).
109. See Jerome G. Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer, “Chance in Human Affairs,” Sociological Theory 12 (1994): 45-56; Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 59-60; Isaiah Berlin, Historical Inevitability (London: Oxford University Press, 1954); Lorenz Kruger, Lorraine J. Daston, and Michael Heidelberger, The Probabilistic Revolution: Ideas in History (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987).
110. Edward Hallett Carr, What is History? (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), chapter 4.
111. Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,” 463; Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, 27; Gerardo L. Munck, “Between Theory and History and Beyond Traditional Area Studies: A New Comparative Perspective on Latin America,” Comparative Politics 25 (1993): 491.
112. Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,” 463; Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, 27; Gerardo L. Munck, “Between Theory and History and Beyond Traditional Area Studies: A New Comparative Perspective on Latin America,” Comparative Politics 25 (1993): 491.
113. Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,” 463; Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, 27; Gerardo L. Munck, “Between Theory and History and Beyond Traditional Area Studies: A New Comparative Perspective on Latin America,” Comparative Politics 25 (1993): 491.
114. Liebowitz and Margolis, “Path-Dependence,” 210.
115. David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY.
116. S. J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, “The Fable of the Keys,” Journal of Law and Economics 33 (1990): 1-25. Additional typewriter formats besides QWERTY and Dvorak have emerged over time, and it is now clear that QWERTY is not an optimal design - even though, as discussed below, the costs of technology reversal would make it inefficient to abandon QWERTY. One might be inclined to argue that QWERTY should be considered a path-dependent outcome because its persis-tence reveals how historical conditions can lead to sub-optimal outcomes, even if its initial adoption and subsequent persistence are fully consistent with neoclassical theory. In this formulation, path dependence entails a self-reinforcing outcome that seems regrettable or illogical in light of currently available options, even though this outcome was fully predictable given the choices that were actually available when the initial selection process occurred (Liebowitz and Margolis, “Path-Dependence,” 211). This broad definition has the unfortunate consequence of making the presence or absence of path dependence hinge on discoveries that occur only after the self-reinforcing sequence is initiated. For example, in this formulation, the QWERTY typewriter became a path-dependent outcome only once actors gained knowledge of superior formats: before this time, it was not possible to assert that QWERTY was sub-optimal. In this definition, ther, the key event that triggers path dependence is knowledge that a superior alternative exists - not the actual adoption of the outcome in the first place. Yet, with many or most self-reinforcing institutions, new knowledge eventually leads actors to realize that an alternative arrangement might have better served needs. Hence, this definition stretches the concept of path dependence to include nearly all institutions, and may degenerate into a kind of “what if" analysis in which the investigator speculates about how the world could have been improved with better knowledge at an earlier point in time. In short, the mere presence of regrettable or seemingly illogical outcomes does not necessarily signify path dependence.
117. S. J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, “The Fable of the Keys,” Journal of Law and Economics 33 (1990): 1-25. Additional typewriter formats besides QWERTY and Dvorak have emerged over time, and it is now clear that QWERTY is not an optimal design - even though, as discussed below, the costs of technology reversal would make it inefficient to abandon QWERTY. One might be inclined to argue that QWERTY should be considered a path-dependent outcome because its persis-tence reveals how historical conditions can lead to sub-optimal outcomes, even if its initial adoption and subsequent persistence are fully consistent with neoclassical theory. In this formulation, path dependence entails a self-reinforcing outcome that seems regrettable or illogical in light of currently available options, even though this outcome was fully predictable given the choices that were actually available when the initial selection process occurred (Liebowitz and Margolis, “Path-Dependence,” 211). This broad definition has the unfortunate consequence of making the presence or absence of path dependence hinge on discoveries that occur only after the self-reinforcing sequence is initiated. For example, in this formulation, the QWERTY typewriter became a path-dependent outcome only once actors gained knowledge of superior formats: before this time, it was not possible to assert that QWERTY was sub-optimal. In this definition, ther, the key event that triggers path dependence is knowledge that a superior alternative exists - not the actual adoption of the outcome in the first place. Yet, with many or most self-reinforcing institutions, new knowledge eventually leads actors to realize that an alternative arrangement might have better served needs. Hence, this definition stretches the concept of path dependence to include nearly all institutions, and may degenerate into a kind of “what if" analysis in which the investigator speculates about how the world could have been improved with better knowledge at an earlier point in time. In short, the mere presence of regrettable or seemingly illogical outcomes does not necessarily signify path dependence.
118. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories, 103-104; Krasner, “Sovereignty,” 80-85.
119. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories, 103-104; Krasner, “Sovereignty,” 80-85.
120. The specific characteristics of institutions especial y susceptible to self-reinforcing path dependence will vary depending on the mechanism of reproduction that characterizes an institution (see below for a discussion of these mechanisms). In the case of utilitarian mechanisms of reproduction, institutions that quickly confer important benefits and rapidly impose costs to transformation are more likely to be characterized by path dependence. For example, in his work on technologies, which relies on an utilitarian framework, Arthur (Increasing Returns, 118) has noted that path dependence is especially likely when there are high set-up costs, positive network externalities, and immediate benefits of adoption through learning processes. These qualities probably apply to many social institutions (Pierson, “Increasing Returns"; Kiser and Hechter “The Debate on Historical Sociology,” 807). Likewise, with power mechanisms of reproduction, institutions that clearly and quickly benefit a particular group of actors without immediately disadvantaging other actors are particularly likely to be characterized by path dependence.
121. The specific characteristics of institutions especial y susceptible to self-reinforcing path dependence will vary depending on the mechanism of reproduction that characterizes an institution (see below for a discussion of these mechanisms). In the case of utilitarian mechanisms of reproduction, institutions that quickly confer important benefits and rapidly impose costs to transformation are more likely to be characterized by path dependence. For example, in his work on technologies, which relies on an utilitarian framework, Arthur (Increasing Returns, 118) has noted that path dependence is especially likely when there are high set-up costs, positive network externalities, and immediate benefits of adoption through learning processes. These qualities probably apply to many social institutions (Pierson, “Increasing Returns"; Kiser and Hechter “The Debate on Historical Sociology,” 807). Likewise, with power mechanisms of reproduction, institutions that clearly and quickly benefit a particular group of actors without immediately disadvantaging other actors are particularly likely to be characterized by path dependence.
122. The specific characteristics of institutions especial y susceptible to self-reinforcing path dependence will vary depending on the mechanism of reproduction that characterizes an institution (see below for a discussion of these mechanisms). In the case of utilitarian mechanisms of reproduction, institutions that quickly confer important benefits and rapidly impose costs to transformation are more likely to be characterized by path dependence. For example, in his work on technologies, which relies on an utilitarian framework, Arthur (Increasing Returns, 118) has noted that path dependence is especially likely when there are high set-up costs, positive network externalities, and immediate benefits of adoption through learning processes. These qualities probably apply to many social institutions (Pierson, “Increasing Returns"; Kiser and Hechter “The Debate on Historical Sociology,” 807). Likewise, with power mechanisms of reproduction, institutions that clearly and quickly benefit a particular group of actors without immediately disadvantaging other actors are particularly likely to be characterized by path dependence.
123. David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY.
124. Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity (New York: Basic Books, 1984), chapyer 2.
125. These frameworks are derived from Collins’s well-known discussion of the rational/utilitarian, Durkheimian, conflict, and microinteractionist traditions. See Randall Collins, Four Sociological Traditions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Of course, there are other ways of characterizing trie theoretical frameworks that guide sociological research. See, for example, Raymond Boudon, Problems of Sociological Epistemology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); Tom Campbell, Seven Theories of Human Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); and Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis (Berkeley: University of California, 1979). I make no claim that the four-told typology discussed here is a definitive characterization. In addition, I am aware that these theoretical traditions might be conceived as “metatheories" that offer only general theorems and no specific propositions independent of “bridging assumptions." Here I take the liberty of giving empirical content to these theoretical traditions by specifying specific propositions associated with each tradition.
126. These frameworks are derived from Collins’s well-known discussion of the rational/utilitarian, Durkheimian, conflict, and microinteractionist traditions. See Randall Collins, Four Sociological Traditions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Of course, there are other ways of characterizing trie theoretical frameworks that guide sociological research. See, for example, Raymond Boudon, Problems of Sociological Epistemology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); Tom Campbell, Seven Theories of Human Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); and Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis (Berkeley: University of California, 1979). I make no claim that the four-told typology discussed here is a definitive characterization. In addition, I am aware that these theoretical traditions might be conceived as “metatheories" that offer only general theorems and no specific propositions independent of “bridging assumptions." Here I take the liberty of giving empirical content to these theoretical traditions by specifying specific propositions associated with each tradition.
127. These frameworks are derived from Collins’s well-known discussion of the rational/utilitarian, Durkheimian, conflict, and microinteractionist traditions. See Randall Collins, Four Sociological Traditions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Of course, there are other ways of characterizing trie theoretical frameworks that guide sociological research. See, for example, Raymond Boudon, Problems of Sociological Epistemology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); Tom Campbell, Seven Theories of Human Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); and Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis (Berkeley: University of California, 1979). I make no claim that the four-told typology discussed here is a definitive characterization. In addition, I am aware that these theoretical traditions might be conceived as “metatheories" that offer only general theorems and no specific propositions independent of “bridging assumptions." Here I take the liberty of giving empirical content to these theoretical traditions by specifying specific propositions associated with each tradition.
128. These frameworks are derived from Collins’s well-known discussion of the rational/utilitarian, Durkheimian, conflict, and microinteractionist traditions. See Randall Collins, Four Sociological Traditions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Of course, there are other ways of characterizing trie theoretical frameworks that guide sociological research. See, for example, Raymond Boudon, Problems of Sociological Epistemology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); Tom Campbell, Seven Theories of Human Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); and Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis (Berkeley: University of California, 1979). I make no claim that the four-told typology discussed here is a definitive characterization. In addition, I am aware that these theoretical traditions might be conceived as “metatheories" that offer only general theorems and no specific propositions independent of “bridging assumptions." Here I take the liberty of giving empirical content to these theoretical traditions by specifying specific propositions associated with each tradition.
129. Charles Camic, “The Utilitarians Revistied,” American Journal of Sociology 85 (1979): 516-550; James S. Coleman. Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1990); Collins, Four Sociological Traditions, chapter 2.
130. Charles Camic, “The Utilitarians Revistied,” American Journal of Sociology 85 (1979): 516-550; James S. Coleman. Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1990); Collins, Four Sociological Traditions, chapter 2.
131. Charles Camic, “The Utilitarians Revistied,” American Journal of Sociology 85 (1979): 516-550; James S. Coleman. Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1990); Collins, Four Sociological Traditions, chapter 2.
132. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, 94.
133. Greg Hill, “History, Necessity, and Rational Choice Theory,” Rationality and Society 9 (1997): 189-213. Edgar Kiser (personal communication) points out that many rational choice analysts do not believe path dependence exists. He suggests that this might explain why there are so few (if any) empirical examinations of path dependence by rational choice theorists in the discipline of sociology.
134. Michael Hechter, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Richard Wippler, “Introduction,” in Michael Hechter, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Richard Wippler, editors, Social Institutions: Their Emergence, Maintenance and Effects (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1990), 5. See also Michael Hechter, “The Emergence of Cooperative Social Institutions,” in Hechter, Opp, and Wippler, editors, Social Institutions; Edgar Kiser, “The Revival of Narrative in Historical Sociology: What Rational Choice Can Contribute,” Politics and Society 24 (1996): 249-271. Recently, Kiser and Hechter have suggested that path dependence may be a useful mode of analysis for historical sociologists. See Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter, “The Debate on Historical Sociology: Rational Choice Theory and Its Critics,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 785-816.
135. Michael Hechter, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Richard Wippler, “Introduction,” in Michael Hechter, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Richard Wippler, editors, Social Institutions: Their Emergence, Maintenance and Effects (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1990), 5. See also Michael Hechter, “The Emergence of Cooperative Social Institutions,” in Hechter, Opp, and Wippler, editors, Social Institutions; Edgar Kiser, “The Revival of Narrative in Historical Sociology: What Rational Choice Can Contribute,” Politics and Society 24 (1996): 249-271. Recently, Kiser and Hechter have suggested that path dependence may be a useful mode of analysis for historical sociologists. See Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter, “The Debate on Historical Sociology: Rational Choice Theory and Its Critics,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 785-816.
136. Michael Hechter, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Richard Wippler, “Introduction,” in Michael Hechter, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Richard Wippler, editors, Social Institutions: Their Emergence, Maintenance and Effects (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1990), 5. See also Michael Hechter, “The Emergence of Cooperative Social Institutions,” in Hechter, Opp, and Wippler, editors, Social Institutions; Edgar Kiser, “The Revival of Narrative in Historical Sociology: What Rational Choice Can Contribute,” Politics and Society 24 (1996): 249-271. Recently, Kiser and Hechter have suggested that path dependence may be a useful mode of analysis for historical sociologists. See Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter, “The Debate on Historical Sociology: Rational Choice Theory and Its Critics,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 785-816.
137. Michael Hechter, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Richard Wippler, “Introduction,” in Michael Hechter, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Richard Wippler, editors, Social Institutions: Their Emergence, Maintenance and Effects (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1990), 5. See also Michael Hechter, “The Emergence of Cooperative Social Institutions,” in Hechter, Opp, and Wippler, editors, Social Institutions; Edgar Kiser, “The Revival of Narrative in Historical Sociology: What Rational Choice Can Contribute,” Politics and Society 24 (1996): 249-271. Recently, Kiser and Hechter have suggested that path dependence may be a useful mode of analysis for historical sociologists. See Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter, “The Debate on Historical Sociology: Rational Choice Theory and Its Critics,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1998): 785-816.
138. Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics,” 116-117. This learning explanation assumes that there are long-run benefits to institutional change.
139. Jorg Meyer-Stamer, “Path Dependence in Regional Development: Persistence and Change in Three Industrial Clusters in Santa Catarina, Brazil,” World Development 26 (1998): 1508.
140. Pierson, “Increasing Returns.
141. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories, 80.
142. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure: Toward the Codification of Theory and Research (Glencoe. Ill.: Free Press, 1949), 23-24; Francesca M. Cancian, “Varieties of Functional Analysis,” in David L. Sills, editors, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: MacMillan. 1968), 30.
143. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure: Toward the Codification of Theory and Research (Glencoe. Ill.: Free Press, 1949), 23-24; Francesca M. Cancian, “Varieties of Functional Analysis,” in David L. Sills, editors, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: MacMillan. 1968), 30.
144. See Nagel, The Structure of Science, 24; Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Power and the Division of Labour (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 36-39.
145. See Nagel, The Structure of Science, 24; Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Power and the Division of Labour (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 36-39.
146. This functional path-dependent logic underlies the punctuated equilibrium model of evolutionary change in biology. See Stephen Jay Gould, Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History (New York: W.W. Norton and Company. 1989); Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge, “Punctuated Equilibria: The Tempo and Mode of Evolution Reconsidered." Paleobiology 3 (1977): 115-151. Thus, in the punctuated equilibrium model, random mutations in specific individuals initially introduce change into a population. This change may rapidly spread through a whole species if - given earlier adaptations and immediate environmental incentives - it is functionally efficient. Once the adaptation is stabilized, it will tend to maintain itself and channel future change. This is true even though the selected adaptation may not be optimal for the species in a functional or utilitarian sense. See also Goldstone, “Initial Conditions,” 836, for a discussion of the path-dependent aspects of evolutionary biology.
147. This functional path-dependent logic underlies the punctuated equilibrium model of evolutionary change in biology. See Stephen Jay Gould, Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History (New York: W.W. Norton and Company. 1989); Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge, “Punctuated Equilibria: The Tempo and Mode of Evolution Reconsidered." Paleobiology 3 (1977): 115-151. Thus, in the punctuated equilibrium model, random mutations in specific individuals initially introduce change into a population. This change may rapidly spread through a whole species if - given earlier adaptations and immediate environmental incentives - it is functionally efficient. Once the adaptation is stabilized, it will tend to maintain itself and channel future change. This is true even though the selected adaptation may not be optimal for the species in a functional or utilitarian sense. See also Goldstone, “Initial Conditions,” 836, for a discussion of the path-dependent aspects of evolutionary biology.
148. This functional path-dependent logic underlies the punctuated equilibrium model of evolutionary change in biology. See Stephen Jay Gould, Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History (New York: W.W. Norton and Company. 1989); Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge, “Punctuated Equilibria: The Tempo and Mode of Evolution Reconsidered." Paleobiology 3 (1977): 115-151. Thus, in the punctuated equilibrium model, random mutations in specific individuals initially introduce change into a population. This change may rapidly spread through a whole species if - given earlier adaptations and immediate environmental incentives - it is functionally efficient. Once the adaptation is stabilized, it will tend to maintain itself and channel future change. This is true even though the selected adaptation may not be optimal for the species in a functional or utilitarian sense. See also Goldstone, “Initial Conditions,” 836, for a discussion of the path-dependent aspects of evolutionary biology.
149. Organizational theorists make a related argument in suggesting that inefficient institutions within an organizational system may persist so long as they enhance the survival prospects of the overall organization. See Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,” American Sociological Review 48 (1983): 147-160: W. Richard Scott and John W. Meyer, “The Organization of Societal Sectors,” in John W. Meyer and W. Richard Scott, editors, Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage, 1983).
150. Organizational theorists make a related argument in suggesting that inefficient institutions within an organizational system may persist so long as they enhance the survival prospects of the overall organization. See Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,” American Sociological Review 48 (1983): 147-160: W. Richard Scott and John W. Meyer, “The Organization of Societal Sectors,” in John W. Meyer and W. Richard Scott, editors, Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage, 1983).
151. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974): Wallerstein, The Modern World System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750 (New York: Academic Press, 1980); Wallerstein, The Modern World System III: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730s-1840s (New York: Academic Press, 1989).
152. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974): Wallerstein, The Modern World System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750 (New York: Academic Press, 1980); Wallerstein, The Modern World System III: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730s-1840s (New York: Academic Press, 1989).
153. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974): Wallerstein, The Modern World System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750 (New York: Academic Press, 1980); Wallerstein, The Modern World System III: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730s-1840s (New York: Academic Press, 1989).
154. Theda Skocpol, “Wallerstein’s World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique,” American Journal of Sociology 82 (1977): 1075-1090; Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41 (1987): 335-370.
155. Theda Skocpol, “Wallerstein’s World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique,” American Journal of Sociology 82 (1977): 1075-1090; Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41 (1987): 335-370.
156. Wallerstein (The Modern World System I) traces the selection of Europe over China to historical peculiarities in the nature of political structures and agrarian economies (p. 63). He suggests these peculiarities favored Europe over China, even though China had many features that would have allowed for a more rapid consolidation of capitalism, which in turn likely would have been beneficial to the system as a whole.
157. Kenneth E. Bock, “Evolution, Function, and Change,” American Sociological Review 28 (1963): 229-237: Ronald Philip Dore, “Function and Cause,” American Sociological Review 26 (1961): 843-853; Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press. 1951).
158. Kenneth E. Bock, “Evolution, Function, and Change,” American Sociological Review 28 (1963): 229-237: Ronald Philip Dore, “Function and Cause,” American Sociological Review 26 (1961): 843-853; Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press. 1951).
159. Kenneth E. Bock, “Evolution, Function, and Change,” American Sociological Review 28 (1963): 229-237: Ronald Philip Dore, “Function and Cause,” American Sociological Review 26 (1961): 843-853; Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press. 1951).
160. The problem is that Wallerstein’s system expands to encompass the entire globe, precluding the possibility of an external shock (barring, for example, an alien invasion or an asteroid collision).
161. See Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 16 (1974): 387-415.
162. See Collins, Four Sociological Traditions, 123; Randall Collins, Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Sociology (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 57-59; Rueschemeyer, Power and the Division of Labour; Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), chapter 2; Anthony Oberschall and Eric M. Leifer, “Efficiency and Social Institutions: Uses and Misuses of Economic Reasoning in Sociology,” Annual Review of Sociology 12 (1986): 233-253.
163. See Collins, Four Sociological Traditions, 123; Randall Collins, Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Sociology (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 57-59; Rueschemeyer, Power and the Division of Labour; Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), chapter 2; Anthony Oberschall and Eric M. Leifer, “Efficiency and Social Institutions: Uses and Misuses of Economic Reasoning in Sociology,” Annual Review of Sociology 12 (1986): 233-253.
164. See Collins, Four Sociological Traditions, 123; Randall Collins, Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Sociology (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 57-59; Rueschemeyer, Power and the Division of Labour; Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), chapter 2; Anthony Oberschall and Eric M. Leifer, “Efficiency and Social Institutions: Uses and Misuses of Economic Reasoning in Sociology,” Annual Review of Sociology 12 (1986): 233-253.
165. See Collins, Four Sociological Traditions, 123; Randall Collins, Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Sociology (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 57-59; Rueschemeyer, Power and the Division of Labour; Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), chapter 2; Anthony Oberschall and Eric M. Leifer, “Efficiency and Social Institutions: Uses and Misuses of Economic Reasoning in Sociology,” Annual Review of Sociology 12 (1986): 233-253.
166. See Collins, Four Sociological Traditions, 123; Randall Collins, Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Sociology (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 57-59; Rueschemeyer, Power and the Division of Labour; Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), chapter 2; Anthony Oberschall and Eric M. Leifer, “Efficiency and Social Institutions: Uses and Misuses of Economic Reasoning in Sociology,” Annual Review of Sociology 12 (1986): 233-253.
167. William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
168. S. N. Eisenstadt, “Institutionalization and Change,” American Sociological Review 29 (1964): 235-247.
169. Michael Burawoy, The Politics of Production: Factory Regimes under Capitalism and Socialism (London: Verso, 1985), 85-86.
170. Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 229-230; Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Peter B. Evans, “The State and Economic Transformation: Toward an Analysis of the Conditions Underlying Effective Intervention,” in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, editors, Bringing the State Buck In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
171. Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Peter B. Evans, “The State and Economic Transformation: Toward an Analysis of the Conditions Underlying Effective Intervention,” in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, editors, Bringing the State Buck In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
172. John Dowling and Jeffrey Pfeffer, “Organizational Legitimacy: Social Values and Organizational Behavior,” Pacific Sociological Review 18 (1975): 122-136; Juan J. Linz, the Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 16-23; W. Richard Scott. “Unpacking Institutional Arguments,” in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors. The New Institutionalism in Organisational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1991). 169-170; Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism,” 387.
173. John Dowling and Jeffrey Pfeffer, “Organizational Legitimacy: Social Values and Organizational Behavior,” Pacific Sociological Review 18 (1975): 122-136; Juan J. Linz, the Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 16-23; W. Richard Scott. “Unpacking Institutional Arguments,” in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors. The New Institutionalism in Organisational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1991). 169-170; Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism,” 387.
174. John Dowling and Jeffrey Pfeffer, “Organizational Legitimacy: Social Values and Organizational Behavior,” Pacific Sociological Review 18 (1975): 122-136; Juan J. Linz, the Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 16-23; W. Richard Scott. “Unpacking Institutional Arguments,” in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors. The New Institutionalism in Organisational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1991). 169-170; Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism,” 387.
175. John Dowling and Jeffrey Pfeffer, “Organizational Legitimacy: Social Values and Organizational Behavior,” Pacific Sociological Review 18 (1975): 122-136; Juan J. Linz, the Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 16-23; W. Richard Scott. “Unpacking Institutional Arguments,” in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors. The New Institutionalism in Organisational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1991). 169-170; Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism,” 387.
176. Karen Orren, Labor, the Law, and Liberal Development in the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
177. Meyer and Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations"; Linz, The Breakdown; Richard R. Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).
178. Meyer and Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations"; Linz, The Breakdown; Richard R. Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).
179. Meyer and Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations"; Linz, The Breakdown; Richard R. Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).
180. Chaos theorists have popularized this idea of “sensitive dependence on initial conditions" with the famous butterfly effect - i.e., “the notion that a butterfly stirring in the air today in Peking can transform storm systems next month in New York." Gleick, Chaos, 8.
181. Larry W. Isaac, Debra A. Street, and Stan J. Knapp, “Analyzing Historical Contingency with Formal Methods: The Case of the ‘Relief Explosion’ and 1968, Sociological Methods and Research 23 (1994): 114-141.
182. Paul Pierson, “Not Just What, But When: Issues of Timing and Sequence in Comparative Politics,” paper prepared for presentation at the American Political Science Association Meetings, Boston, September 1998, 21. A revised version of the article is forthcoming in Studies in American Political Development. The forth-coming article will be accompanied by commentaries from Amy Bridges, Robert Jervis, and Kathleen Thelen, as well as a response to the commentaries by Pierson.
183. See the “Cleopatra’s Nose Problem" discussed in Blaise Pascal, Pensées and Other Writings, translated by Honor Levi (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995/1670); and Carr, What is History?.
184. See the “Cleopatra’s Nose Problem" discussed in Blaise Pascal, Pensées and Other Writings, translated by Honor Levi (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995/1670); and Carr, What is History?.
185. Sewell, “Historical Events,” 843.
186. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 320; Abbott, “From Causes to Events,” 438-439; Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,” 466-467; Quadagno and Knapp, “Have Historical Sociologists,” 499; Sewell, “Historical Events,” 862. The concept of “conjuncture" has been defined in other ways. For example, Braudel defines conjuncture as a substantial period of time (e.g., 10 to 50 year periods). See Fernand Braudel, On History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
187. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 320; Abbott, “From Causes to Events,” 438-439; Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,” 466-467; Quadagno and Knapp, “Have Historical Sociologists,” 499; Sewell, “Historical Events,” 862. The concept of “conjuncture" has been defined in other ways. For example, Braudel defines conjuncture as a substantial period of time (e.g., 10 to 50 year periods). See Fernand Braudel, On History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
188. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 320; Abbott, “From Causes to Events,” 438-439; Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,” 466-467; Quadagno and Knapp, “Have Historical Sociologists,” 499; Sewell, “Historical Events,” 862. The concept of “conjuncture" has been defined in other ways. For example, Braudel defines conjuncture as a substantial period of time (e.g., 10 to 50 year periods). See Fernand Braudel, On History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
189. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 320; Abbott, “From Causes to Events,” 438-439; Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,” 466-467; Quadagno and Knapp, “Have Historical Sociologists,” 499; Sewell, “Historical Events,” 862. The concept of “conjuncture" has been defined in other ways. For example, Braudel defines conjuncture as a substantial period of time (e.g., 10 to 50 year periods). See Fernand Braudel, On History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
190. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 320; Abbott, “From Causes to Events,” 438-439; Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,” 466-467; Quadagno and Knapp, “Have Historical Sociologists,” 499; Sewell, “Historical Events,” 862. The concept of “conjuncture" has been defined in other ways. For example, Braudel defines conjuncture as a substantial period of time (e.g., 10 to 50 year periods). See Fernand Braudel, On History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
191. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 320; Abbott, “From Causes to Events,” 438-439; Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,” 466-467; Quadagno and Knapp, “Have Historical Sociologists,” 499; Sewell, “Historical Events,” 862. The concept of “conjuncture" has been defined in other ways. For example, Braudel defines conjuncture as a substantial period of time (e.g., 10 to 50 year periods). See Fernand Braudel, On History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
192. Alan S. Zuckerman, “Reformulating Explanatory Standards and Advancing Theory in Comparative Politics,” in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, editors, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 289; Raymond Boudon, Theories of Social Change: A Critical Appraisal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 175; Maurice Mandelbaum, Purpose and Necessity in Social Theory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 156-157. The contingency of conjunctures is precisely why some historical sociologists argue that “agency" can be especially efficacious during these periods (e.g., Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,” 467; Sewell “Three Temporalities").
193. Alan S. Zuckerman, “Reformulating Explanatory Standards and Advancing Theory in Comparative Politics,” in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, editors, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 289; Raymond Boudon, Theories of Social Change: A Critical Appraisal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 175; Maurice Mandelbaum, Purpose and Necessity in Social Theory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 156-157. The contingency of conjunctures is precisely why some historical sociologists argue that “agency" can be especially efficacious during these periods (e.g., Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,” 467; Sewell “Three Temporalities").
194. Alan S. Zuckerman, “Reformulating Explanatory Standards and Advancing Theory in Comparative Politics,” in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, editors, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 289; Raymond Boudon, Theories of Social Change: A Critical Appraisal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 175; Maurice Mandelbaum, Purpose and Necessity in Social Theory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 156-157. The contingency of conjunctures is precisely why some historical sociologists argue that “agency" can be especially efficacious during these periods (e.g., Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,” 467; Sewell “Three Temporalities").
195. Alan S. Zuckerman, “Reformulating Explanatory Standards and Advancing Theory in Comparative Politics,” in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, editors, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 289; Raymond Boudon, Theories of Social Change: A Critical Appraisal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 175; Maurice Mandelbaum, Purpose and Necessity in Social Theory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 156-157. The contingency of conjunctures is precisely why some historical sociologists argue that “agency" can be especially efficacious during these periods (e.g., Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,” 467; Sewell “Three Temporalities").
196. Alan S. Zuckerman, “Reformulating Explanatory Standards and Advancing Theory in Comparative Politics,” in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, editors, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 289; Raymond Boudon, Theories of Social Change: A Critical Appraisal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 175; Maurice Mandelbaum, Purpose and Necessity in Social Theory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 156-157. The contingency of conjunctures is precisely why some historical sociologists argue that “agency" can be especially efficacious during these periods (e.g., Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,” 467; Sewell “Three Temporalities").
197. Leon Glass and Michael C. Mackey, From Clocks to Chaos: The Rhythms of Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 6-7; Donald N. McCloskey, “History, Differential Equations, and the Problem of Narration,” History and Theory 30 (1991): 32; George Reisch, “Chaos, History, and Narrative,” History and Theory 30 (1991): 4-6; David Ruelle, Chance and Chaos (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 47.
198. Leon Glass and Michael C. Mackey, From Clocks to Chaos: The Rhythms of Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 6-7; Donald N. McCloskey, “History, Differential Equations, and the Problem of Narration,” History and Theory 30 (1991): 32; George Reisch, “Chaos, History, and Narrative,” History and Theory 30 (1991): 4-6; David Ruelle, Chance and Chaos (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 47.
199. Leon Glass and Michael C. Mackey, From Clocks to Chaos: The Rhythms of Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 6-7; Donald N. McCloskey, “History, Differential Equations, and the Problem of Narration,” History and Theory 30 (1991): 32; George Reisch, “Chaos, History, and Narrative,” History and Theory 30 (1991): 4-6; David Ruelle, Chance and Chaos (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 47.
200. Leon Glass and Michael C. Mackey, From Clocks to Chaos: The Rhythms of Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 6-7; Donald N. McCloskey, “History, Differential Equations, and the Problem of Narration,” History and Theory 30 (1991): 32; George Reisch, “Chaos, History, and Narrative,” History and Theory 30 (1991): 4-6; David Ruelle, Chance and Chaos (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 47.
201. Michael Shermer, “Exorcising Laplace’s Demon: Chaos and Antichaos, History and Metahistory,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 73; Reisch, “Chaos, History, and Narrative,” 17-18.
202. Michael Shermer, “Exorcising Laplace’s Demon: Chaos and Antichaos, History and Metahistory,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 73; Reisch, “Chaos, History, and Narrative,” 17-18.
203. Reisch, “Chaos, History, and Narrative"; George Reisch, “Scientism without Tears: A Reply to Roth and Ryckman,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 45-58. See also Paul A. Roth and Thomas A. Ryckman, “Chaos, Clio, and Scientific Illusions of Understanding,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 30-44. On narrative, see Philip Abrams, Historical Sociology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982); Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,”463; Isaiah Berlin, “The Concept of Scientific History,” History and Theory 1 (1961): 1-31; Griffin, “Narrative"; James Mahoney, “Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1999): 1164-1168; Dale H. Porter, The Emergence of the Past: A Theory of Historical Explanation (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1981).
204. Reisch, “Chaos, History, and Narrative"; George Reisch, “Scientism without Tears: A Reply to Roth and Ryckman,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 45-58. See also Paul A. Roth and Thomas A. Ryckman, “Chaos, Clio, and Scientific Illusions of Understanding,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 30-44. On narrative, see Philip Abrams, Historical Sociology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982); Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,”463; Isaiah Berlin, “The Concept of Scientific History,” History and Theory 1 (1961): 1-31; Griffin, “Narrative"; James Mahoney, “Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1999): 1164-1168; Dale H. Porter, The Emergence of the Past: A Theory of Historical Explanation (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1981).
205. Reisch, “Chaos, History, and Narrative"; George Reisch, “Scientism without Tears: A Reply to Roth and Ryckman,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 45-58. See also Paul A. Roth and Thomas A. Ryckman, “Chaos, Clio, and Scientific Illusions of Understanding,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 30-44. On narrative, see Philip Abrams, Historical Sociology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982); Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,”463; Isaiah Berlin, “The Concept of Scientific History,” History and Theory 1 (1961): 1-31; Griffin, “Narrative"; James Mahoney, “Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1999): 1164-1168; Dale H. Porter, The Emergence of the Past: A Theory of Historical Explanation (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1981).
206. Reisch, “Chaos, History, and Narrative"; George Reisch, “Scientism without Tears: A Reply to Roth and Ryckman,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 45-58. See also Paul A. Roth and Thomas A. Ryckman, “Chaos, Clio, and Scientific Illusions of Understanding,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 30-44. On narrative, see Philip Abrams, Historical Sociology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982); Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,”463; Isaiah Berlin, “The Concept of Scientific History,” History and Theory 1 (1961): 1-31; Griffin, “Narrative"; James Mahoney, “Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1999): 1164-1168; Dale H. Porter, The Emergence of the Past: A Theory of Historical Explanation (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1981).
207. Reisch, “Chaos, History, and Narrative"; George Reisch, “Scientism without Tears: A Reply to Roth and Ryckman,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 45-58. See also Paul A. Roth and Thomas A. Ryckman, “Chaos, Clio, and Scientific Illusions of Understanding,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 30-44. On narrative, see Philip Abrams, Historical Sociology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982); Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,”463; Isaiah Berlin, “The Concept of Scientific History,” History and Theory 1 (1961): 1-31; Griffin, “Narrative"; James Mahoney, “Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1999): 1164-1168; Dale H. Porter, The Emergence of the Past: A Theory of Historical Explanation (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1981).
208. Reisch, “Chaos, History, and Narrative"; George Reisch, “Scientism without Tears: A Reply to Roth and Ryckman,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 45-58. See also Paul A. Roth and Thomas A. Ryckman, “Chaos, Clio, and Scientific Illusions of Understanding,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 30-44. On narrative, see Philip Abrams, Historical Sociology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982); Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,”463; Isaiah Berlin, “The Concept of Scientific History,” History and Theory 1 (1961): 1-31; Griffin, “Narrative"; James Mahoney, “Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1999): 1164-1168; Dale H. Porter, The Emergence of the Past: A Theory of Historical Explanation (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1981).
209. Reisch, “Chaos, History, and Narrative"; George Reisch, “Scientism without Tears: A Reply to Roth and Ryckman,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 45-58. See also Paul A. Roth and Thomas A. Ryckman, “Chaos, Clio, and Scientific Illusions of Understanding,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 30-44. On narrative, see Philip Abrams, Historical Sociology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982); Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,”463; Isaiah Berlin, “The Concept of Scientific History,” History and Theory 1 (1961): 1-31; Griffin, “Narrative"; James Mahoney, “Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1999): 1164-1168; Dale H. Porter, The Emergence of the Past: A Theory of Historical Explanation (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1981).
210. Reisch, “Chaos, History, and Narrative"; George Reisch, “Scientism without Tears: A Reply to Roth and Ryckman,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 45-58. See also Paul A. Roth and Thomas A. Ryckman, “Chaos, Clio, and Scientific Illusions of Understanding,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 30-44. On narrative, see Philip Abrams, Historical Sociology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982); Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,”463; Isaiah Berlin, “The Concept of Scientific History,” History and Theory 1 (1961): 1-31; Griffin, “Narrative"; James Mahoney, “Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1999): 1164-1168; Dale H. Porter, The Emergence of the Past: A Theory of Historical Explanation (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1981).
211. Reisch, “Chaos, History, and Narrative"; George Reisch, “Scientism without Tears: A Reply to Roth and Ryckman,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 45-58. See also Paul A. Roth and Thomas A. Ryckman, “Chaos, Clio, and Scientific Illusions of Understanding,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 30-44. On narrative, see Philip Abrams, Historical Sociology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982); Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,”463; Isaiah Berlin, “The Concept of Scientific History,” History and Theory 1 (1961): 1-31; Griffin, “Narrative"; James Mahoney, “Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1999): 1164-1168; Dale H. Porter, The Emergence of the Past: A Theory of Historical Explanation (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1981).
212. Reisch, “Chaos, History, and Narrative"; George Reisch, “Scientism without Tears: A Reply to Roth and Ryckman,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 45-58. See also Paul A. Roth and Thomas A. Ryckman, “Chaos, Clio, and Scientific Illusions of Understanding,” History and Theory 34 (1995): 30-44. On narrative, see Philip Abrams, Historical Sociology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982); Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,”463; Isaiah Berlin, “The Concept of Scientific History,” History and Theory 1 (1961): 1-31; Griffin, “Narrative"; James Mahoney, “Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis,” American Journal of Sociology 104 (1999): 1164-1168; Dale H. Porter, The Emergence of the Past: A Theory of Historical Explanation (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1981).
213. Reisch, “Chaos, History, and Narrative,” 17.
214. Fearon, “Causes and Counterfactuals,” 56-58, 66.
215. Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,” 463; see also Til y, As Sociology Meets History; Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena; Griffin, “Narrative.
216. Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,” 463; see also Til y, As Sociology Meets History; Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena; Griffin, “Narrative.
217. Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,” 463; see also Til y, As Sociology Meets History; Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena; Griffin, “Narrative.
218. Aminzade, “Historical Sociology,” 463; see also Til y, As Sociology Meets History; Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena; Griffin, “Narrative.
219. Griffin and Ragin, “Some Observations,” 13.
220. Abbott, “From Causes to Events,” 445.
221. Goldstone, “Initial Conditions,” 833. See also Haydu, “Making Use of the Past,” 350-351.
222. Goldstone, “Initial Conditions,” 833. See also Haydu, “Making Use of the Past,” 350-351.
223. A promising technique for analyzing the linkages in reactive sequences is discussed in Peter Bearman, Robert Paris, and James Moody, “Blocking the Future,” Social Science History 23 (1999): 501-534.
224. Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events,” 130, 132.
225. Mahoney, “Strategies of Causal Inference"; Michael E. Sobel, “Causal Inference in the Social and Behavioral Sciences,” in Gerhard Arminger, Clifford C. Clogg, Michael E. Sobel, editors, Handbook of Statistical Modeling for the Social and Behavioral Sciences (New York: Plenum Press, 1995), 5.
226. Mahoney, “Strategies of Causal Inference"; Michael E. Sobel, “Causal Inference in the Social and Behavioral Sciences,” in Gerhard Arminger, Clifford C. Clogg, Michael E. Sobel, editors, Handbook of Statistical Modeling for the Social and Behavioral Sciences (New York: Plenum Press, 1995), 5.
227. Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events,” 132.
228. Griffin, “Narrative,” 1105. Event-structure analysis offers a formal basis for transforming a chronological narrative of events into a series of “yes/no" questions in which the analyst decides whether a given event is “required" (i.e., necessary) for a subsequent event.
229. See Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events,” 130, 132; Mahoney, “Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative.
230. See Abbott, “Sequences of Social Events,” 130, 132; Mahoney, “Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative.
231. A wide range of scholars have underscored the importance of identifying such mechanisms because they are the processes that “explain" how values on one variable actually cause values on another variable. For example, see Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (London: Leeds Books, 1975); Hubert M. Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961); Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” Advances in Information Processing in Organizations 2 (1985): 21-58; John H. Goldthorpe, “Causation, Statistics and Sociology,” unpublished manuscript, Nuffield College. Oxford University, 1998; Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg. editors. Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Kiser. “The Revival of Narrative"; Kiser and Hechter. “The Role of General Theory"; Somers, “We’re No Angels"; 722-784; George Steinmetz, “Critical Realism and Historical Sociology,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 40 (1998): 170-186. The study of causal mechanisms is connected with the realist school in the philosophy of science, which is itself quite divided (see Craig Calhoun. “Explanation in Historical Sociology: Narrative, General Theory, and Historically Specific Theory.’" American Journal of Sociology 104 [1998]: 846-871). In this article, I am not concerned with uncovering the ontological underpinnings of realism.
232. A wide range of scholars have underscored the importance of identifying such mechanisms because they are the processes that “explain" how values on one variable actually cause values on another variable. For example, see Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (London: Leeds Books, 1975); Hubert M. Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961); Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” Advances in Information Processing in Organizations 2 (1985): 21-58; John H. Goldthorpe, “Causation, Statistics and Sociology,” unpublished manuscript, Nuffield College. Oxford University, 1998; Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg. editors. Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Kiser. “The Revival of Narrative"; Kiser and Hechter. “The Role of General Theory"; Somers, “We’re No Angels"; 722-784; George Steinmetz, “Critical Realism and Historical Sociology,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 40 (1998): 170-186. The study of causal mechanisms is connected with the realist school in the philosophy of science, which is itself quite divided (see Craig Calhoun. “Explanation in Historical Sociology: Narrative, General Theory, and Historically Specific Theory.’" American Journal of Sociology 104 [1998]: 846-871). In this article, I am not concerned with uncovering the ontological underpinnings of realism.
233. A wide range of scholars have underscored the importance of identifying such mechanisms because they are the processes that “explain" how values on one variable actually cause values on another variable. For example, see Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (London: Leeds Books, 1975); Hubert M. Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961); Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” Advances in Information Processing in Organizations 2 (1985): 21-58; John H. Goldthorpe, “Causation, Statistics and Sociology,” unpublished manuscript, Nuffield College. Oxford University, 1998; Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg. editors. Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Kiser. “The Revival of Narrative"; Kiser and Hechter. “The Role of General Theory"; Somers, “We’re No Angels"; 722-784; George Steinmetz, “Critical Realism and Historical Sociology,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 40 (1998): 170-186. The study of causal mechanisms is connected with the realist school in the philosophy of science, which is itself quite divided (see Craig Calhoun. “Explanation in Historical Sociology: Narrative, General Theory, and Historically Specific Theory.’" American Journal of Sociology 104 [1998]: 846-871). In this article, I am not concerned with uncovering the ontological underpinnings of realism.
234. A wide range of scholars have underscored the importance of identifying such mechanisms because they are the processes that “explain" how values on one variable actually cause values on another variable. For example, see Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (London: Leeds Books, 1975); Hubert M. Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961); Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” Advances in Information Processing in Organizations 2 (1985): 21-58; John H. Goldthorpe, “Causation, Statistics and Sociology,” unpublished manuscript, Nuffield College. Oxford University, 1998; Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg. editors. Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Kiser. “The Revival of Narrative"; Kiser and Hechter. “The Role of General Theory"; Somers, “We’re No Angels"; 722-784; George Steinmetz, “Critical Realism and Historical Sociology,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 40 (1998): 170-186. The study of causal mechanisms is connected with the realist school in the philosophy of science, which is itself quite divided (see Craig Calhoun. “Explanation in Historical Sociology: Narrative, General Theory, and Historically Specific Theory.’" American Journal of Sociology 104 [1998]: 846-871). In this article, I am not concerned with uncovering the ontological underpinnings of realism.
235. A wide range of scholars have underscored the importance of identifying such mechanisms because they are the processes that “explain" how values on one variable actually cause values on another variable. For example, see Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (London: Leeds Books, 1975); Hubert M. Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961); Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” Advances in Information Processing in Organizations 2 (1985): 21-58; John H. Goldthorpe, “Causation, Statistics and Sociology,” unpublished manuscript, Nuffield College. Oxford University, 1998; Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg. editors. Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Kiser. “The Revival of Narrative"; Kiser and Hechter. “The Role of General Theory"; Somers, “We’re No Angels"; 722-784; George Steinmetz, “Critical Realism and Historical Sociology,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 40 (1998): 170-186. The study of causal mechanisms is connected with the realist school in the philosophy of science, which is itself quite divided (see Craig Calhoun. “Explanation in Historical Sociology: Narrative, General Theory, and Historically Specific Theory.’" American Journal of Sociology 104 [1998]: 846-871). In this article, I am not concerned with uncovering the ontological underpinnings of realism.
236. A wide range of scholars have underscored the importance of identifying such mechanisms because they are the processes that “explain" how values on one variable actually cause values on another variable. For example, see Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (London: Leeds Books, 1975); Hubert M. Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961); Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” Advances in Information Processing in Organizations 2 (1985): 21-58; John H. Goldthorpe, “Causation, Statistics and Sociology,” unpublished manuscript, Nuffield College. Oxford University, 1998; Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg. editors. Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Kiser. “The Revival of Narrative"; Kiser and Hechter. “The Role of General Theory"; Somers, “We’re No Angels"; 722-784; George Steinmetz, “Critical Realism and Historical Sociology,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 40 (1998): 170-186. The study of causal mechanisms is connected with the realist school in the philosophy of science, which is itself quite divided (see Craig Calhoun. “Explanation in Historical Sociology: Narrative, General Theory, and Historically Specific Theory.’" American Journal of Sociology 104 [1998]: 846-871). In this article, I am not concerned with uncovering the ontological underpinnings of realism.
237. A wide range of scholars have underscored the importance of identifying such mechanisms because they are the processes that “explain" how values on one variable actually cause values on another variable. For example, see Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (London: Leeds Books, 1975); Hubert M. Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961); Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” Advances in Information Processing in Organizations 2 (1985): 21-58; John H. Goldthorpe, “Causation, Statistics and Sociology,” unpublished manuscript, Nuffield College. Oxford University, 1998; Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg. editors. Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Kiser. “The Revival of Narrative"; Kiser and Hechter. “The Role of General Theory"; Somers, “We’re No Angels"; 722-784; George Steinmetz, “Critical Realism and Historical Sociology,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 40 (1998): 170-186. The study of causal mechanisms is connected with the realist school in the philosophy of science, which is itself quite divided (see Craig Calhoun. “Explanation in Historical Sociology: Narrative, General Theory, and Historically Specific Theory.’" American Journal of Sociology 104 [1998]: 846-871). In this article, I am not concerned with uncovering the ontological underpinnings of realism.
238. A wide range of scholars have underscored the importance of identifying such mechanisms because they are the processes that “explain" how values on one variable actually cause values on another variable. For example, see Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (London: Leeds Books, 1975); Hubert M. Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961); Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” Advances in Information Processing in Organizations 2 (1985): 21-58; John H. Goldthorpe, “Causation, Statistics and Sociology,” unpublished manuscript, Nuffield College. Oxford University, 1998; Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg. editors. Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Kiser. “The Revival of Narrative"; Kiser and Hechter. “The Role of General Theory"; Somers, “We’re No Angels"; 722-784; George Steinmetz, “Critical Realism and Historical Sociology,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 40 (1998): 170-186. The study of causal mechanisms is connected with the realist school in the philosophy of science, which is itself quite divided (see Craig Calhoun. “Explanation in Historical Sociology: Narrative, General Theory, and Historically Specific Theory.’" American Journal of Sociology 104 [1998]: 846-871). In this article, I am not concerned with uncovering the ontological underpinnings of realism.
239. A wide range of scholars have underscored the importance of identifying such mechanisms because they are the processes that “explain" how values on one variable actually cause values on another variable. For example, see Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (London: Leeds Books, 1975); Hubert M. Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961); Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” Advances in Information Processing in Organizations 2 (1985): 21-58; John H. Goldthorpe, “Causation, Statistics and Sociology,” unpublished manuscript, Nuffield College. Oxford University, 1998; Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg. editors. Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Kiser. “The Revival of Narrative"; Kiser and Hechter. “The Role of General Theory"; Somers, “We’re No Angels"; 722-784; George Steinmetz, “Critical Realism and Historical Sociology,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 40 (1998): 170-186. The study of causal mechanisms is connected with the realist school in the philosophy of science, which is itself quite divided (see Craig Calhoun. “Explanation in Historical Sociology: Narrative, General Theory, and Historically Specific Theory.’" American Journal of Sociology 104 [1998]: 846-871). In this article, I am not concerned with uncovering the ontological underpinnings of realism.
240. A wide range of scholars have underscored the importance of identifying such mechanisms because they are the processes that “explain" how values on one variable actually cause values on another variable. For example, see Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (London: Leeds Books, 1975); Hubert M. Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961); Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” Advances in Information Processing in Organizations 2 (1985): 21-58; John H. Goldthorpe, “Causation, Statistics and Sociology,” unpublished manuscript, Nuffield College. Oxford University, 1998; Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg. editors. Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Kiser. “The Revival of Narrative"; Kiser and Hechter. “The Role of General Theory"; Somers, “We’re No Angels"; 722-784; George Steinmetz, “Critical Realism and Historical Sociology,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 40 (1998): 170-186. The study of causal mechanisms is connected with the realist school in the philosophy of science, which is itself quite divided (see Craig Calhoun. “Explanation in Historical Sociology: Narrative, General Theory, and Historically Specific Theory.’" American Journal of Sociology 104 [1998]: 846-871). In this article, I am not concerned with uncovering the ontological underpinnings of realism.
241. A wide range of scholars have underscored the importance of identifying such mechanisms because they are the processes that “explain" how values on one variable actually cause values on another variable. For example, see Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (London: Leeds Books, 1975); Hubert M. Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961); Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” Advances in Information Processing in Organizations 2 (1985): 21-58; John H. Goldthorpe, “Causation, Statistics and Sociology,” unpublished manuscript, Nuffield College. Oxford University, 1998; Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg. editors. Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Kiser. “The Revival of Narrative"; Kiser and Hechter. “The Role of General Theory"; Somers, “We’re No Angels"; 722-784; George Steinmetz, “Critical Realism and Historical Sociology,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 40 (1998): 170-186. The study of causal mechanisms is connected with the realist school in the philosophy of science, which is itself quite divided (see Craig Calhoun. “Explanation in Historical Sociology: Narrative, General Theory, and Historically Specific Theory.’" American Journal of Sociology 104 [1998]: 846-871). In this article, I am not concerned with uncovering the ontological underpinnings of realism.
242. Haydu, “Making Use of the Past,” 351: Goldstone, “Initial Conditions,” 833.
243. Haydu, “Making Use of the Past,” 351: Goldstone, “Initial Conditions,” 833.
244. Ultimately, all scholarly enterprises must take certain mechanisms for granted. For example, in historical sociology, in order that analysts can focus on the macroprocesses of interest, it is often necessary to leave psychological mechanisms implicit.
245. Aminzade, “Historical Sociology"; Larry J. Griffin, “Temporality, Events, and Explanation"; Margaret R. Somers. “Narrativity, Narrative Identity, and Social Action: Rethinking English Working-Class Formation,” Social Science History 16 (1992): 591-630; Lawrence Stone. “The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History,” Past und Present 85 (1979): 3-24; Robin Stryker, “Beyond History Versus Theory: Strategic Narrative and Sociological Explanation,” Sociological Methods and Research 24 (1996): 304-352.
246. Aminzade, “Historical Sociology"; Larry J. Griffin, “Temporality, Events, and Explanation"; Margaret R. Somers. “Narrativity, Narrative Identity, and Social Action: Rethinking English Working-Class Formation,” Social Science History 16 (1992): 591-630; Lawrence Stone. “The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History,” Past und Present 85 (1979): 3-24; Robin Stryker, “Beyond History Versus Theory: Strategic Narrative and Sociological Explanation,” Sociological Methods and Research 24 (1996): 304-352.
247. Aminzade, “Historical Sociology"; Larry J. Griffin, “Temporality, Events, and Explanation"; Margaret R. Somers. “Narrativity, Narrative Identity, and Social Action: Rethinking English Working-Class Formation,” Social Science History 16 (1992): 591-630; Lawrence Stone. “The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History,” Past und Present 85 (1979): 3-24; Robin Stryker, “Beyond History Versus Theory: Strategic Narrative and Sociological Explanation,” Sociological Methods and Research 24 (1996): 304-352.
248. Aminzade, “Historical Sociology"; Larry J. Griffin, “Temporality, Events, and Explanation"; Margaret R. Somers. “Narrativity, Narrative Identity, and Social Action: Rethinking English Working-Class Formation,” Social Science History 16 (1992): 591-630; Lawrence Stone. “The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History,” Past und Present 85 (1979): 3-24; Robin Stryker, “Beyond History Versus Theory: Strategic Narrative and Sociological Explanation,” Sociological Methods and Research 24 (1996): 304-352.
249. Aminzade, “Historical Sociology"; Larry J. Griffin, “Temporality, Events, and Explanation"; Margaret R. Somers. “Narrativity, Narrative Identity, and Social Action: Rethinking English Working-Class Formation,” Social Science History 16 (1992): 591-630; Lawrence Stone. “The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History,” Past und Present 85 (1979): 3-24; Robin Stryker, “Beyond History Versus Theory: Strategic Narrative and Sociological Explanation,” Sociological Methods and Research 24 (1996): 304-352.
250. Peter Temin, “Free Land and Federalism: American Economic Exceptionalism,” in Byron E. Shafer, editor, Is America Different? A New Look at American Exceptionalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); Kim Voss, The Making of American Exceptionalism: The Knights of Labor and Class Formation in the Nineteenth Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
251. Peter Temin, “Free Land and Federalism: American Economic Exceptionalism,” in Byron E. Shafer, editor, Is America Different? A New Look at American Exceptionalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); Kim Voss, The Making of American Exceptionalism: The Knights of Labor and Class Formation in the Nineteenth Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
252. Howard Kimeldorf, Reds or Rackets? The Making of Radical and Conservative Unions on the Waterfront (Berkeley: University of California, 1988), esp. chapter 7.
253. Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin Trow, and James Coleman, Union Democracy: The Inside Politics of the International Typographical Union (New York: Free Press, 1956), 394.
254. See Emigh, “The Power of Negative Thinking"; Richard Franklin Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859-1877 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
255. See Emigh, “The Power of Negative Thinking"; Richard Franklin Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859-1877 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
256. Jack A. Goldstone, “The Problem of the ‘Early Modern’ World,” Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient 41 (1998): 249-284. Page numbers in the text are from this article.
257. Andrew Abbott. “Transcending General Linear Reality,” Sociological Theory 6 (1988): 177.
258. Abbott, “Transcending General Linear Reality,” 173.
259. Goldstone, “Initial Conditions,” 843.