Avoiding Advice and Consent: Recess Appointments and Presidential Power

Presidential Studies Quarterly

Volumn 36, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 670-680

  Corley, Pamela C ^a  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85050420782     PISSN: 03604918     EISSN: 17415705     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-5705.2006.02573.x     Document Type: Article

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