Strategic decisions on lawyers' compensation in civil disputes

Economic Inquiry

Volumn 45, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 854-863

  Baik, Kyung Hwan ^a   Kim, In Gyu ^b  

^a Sungkyunkwan University   (South Korea)

^b Hallym University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 35349008552     PISSN: 00952583     EISSN: 14657295     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00054.x     Document Type: Article

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