On the convergence of multicast games in directed networks

Annual ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 330-338

  Fanelli, Angelo ^a   Flammini, Michele ^a   Moscardelli, Luca ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF L'AQUILA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Limited number of best response moves; Multicast games; Price of anarchy

Indexed keywords

CONVERGENCE OF NUMERICAL METHODS; MULTICASTING; SET THEORY; SIGNAL RECEIVERS; STRATEGIC PLANNING; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

MULTICAST GAMES; PRICE OF ANARCHY;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 35248822685     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1248377.1248433     Document Type: Conference Paper

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